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Punishment continues to be used by organizations as one method to eliminate unwanted
employee behaviors. Bennett (1998) argued that managers must be aware of two aspects
of the punishment situation: (a) the punishment intensity and (b) the negative
consequences of the punishment. Previous research indicates that strong punishments are
most effective at changing unwanted behaviors, but strong punishments are also more
prone to producing negative attitudes in the punished individual. One way managers may
be able to reduce the negative impact of punishment is by using explanations regarding
the need for punishment. These explanations are called social accounts. Not all social
accounts have the same effectiveness; therefore, both ideological and causal accounts
were examined in this research to evaluate their effectiveness in mitigating the negative
impact of punishment. Using a 3x3 between-subjects design, the effect of punishment
severity (low, moderate and high) and social account type (ideological, causal, and
redundant) on performance, fairness of punishment, Interactional Justice, satisfaction
with the experiment, anger, and intentions to retaliate was assessed. One hundred eighty
undergraduate students from a Midwest university participated in the study. Participants
were given an opportunity to win lottery tickets for a $150 gift certificate based on their
performance on two simple tasks. Participants were told that lottery tickets would be

removed (low, moderate, or high punishment) if they did not perform satisfactorily on
Task 1. After the punishment, participants were given one of three social accounts and a
set of questionnaires examining their attitudes. Task 2 was completed to determine the
behavior change from Task 1 to Task 2. A significant main effect of punishment severity
was found for punishment fairness, satisfaction with the experiment, anger, and intentions
to retaliate. A significant main effect of account type was found for Interactional Justice
and satisfaction with the experiment. Finally, a significant interaction of punishment
severity and account type was found for performance such that a moderate punishment
with a social account produced greater task 2 performance after accounting for task 1
performance. Despite lacking significance, other conditions produced high task 2
performances. This research indicates that punishment severity and account type have a
simple relationship with the attitudinal variables and have a complex relationship with
task performance. Future research should examine the characteristics and presentation of
social accounts in punishment situations that maximally reduce the negative impact of
punishment incidents.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Punishment is used by workplace supervisors to control or change employees’
behavior. Punishment continues despite the call from management researchers to
eliminate punishment from organizational discipline because of victims’ negative
reactions to the administered punishment (Butterfield, Trevino, & Ball, 1996).
Researchers propose that employees’ poor behavior should be changed and exemplary
behavior should be maintained with positive reinforcement because no signs o f negative
side effects will appear. Despite the fact that punishment causes negative side effects,
three reasons have been proposed to explain why punishment continues to be used in
organizations: (a) punishment effectively changes behaviors; (b) positive reinforcement
is impossible to use in some situations; and (c) punishment is often more time- and costefficient (Avery & Ivancevich, 1980). Since managers are reluctant to eliminate
punishment as their agent o f behavioral change, it is important to determine how
punishment affects employees’ perceptions of fairness and ultimately their change in
behavior.
Bennett (1998) proposed that whenever punishment is studied the research must
focus on two fundamental questions: (a) when will punishment be most effective at
facilitating behavioral change and (b) when will punishment cause negative side effects?
The most commonly researched variable associated with punishment effectiveness has
been punishment severity. Currently, no research finding has provided ubiquitous
support for a particular level o f punishment that is most effective at behavior change.
The most often cited finding o f the punishment research has been that intense
punishments most effectively change undesirable behaviors (Bemiett, 1998; Church,
1963; Johnston, 1972). Employees who are given a very strong punishment are more

2

likely to apply the appropriate behavior change than employees given weak punishments.
The employee given a strong punishment changes his/her behavior because he/she does
not want to receive the negative outcome again. Weak punishments typically do not
change behavior because the negative outcome from the punishment is not strong enough
to harm the employee.
These strong punishments, despite their effectiveness at changing employee
behavior, may cause the negative consequences found to accompany strong punishment
events. The negative side effects that accompany punishment include avoidance,
resentment, retaliation, and anger. These are the same reactions employees display after
receiving unfair reward allocation decisions (e.g., layoffs, pay-cut, performance
appraisal). Therefore, employees may react to strong punishments negatively because
they perceive the punishment as unfair. Here lies the dilemma with punishment. First, in
order to change an individual’s behavior, the supervisor must apply a relatively strong
punishment. Second, if the supervisor applies a relatively strong punishment, the
employee perceives the punishment as unfair, which results in negative reactions by the
employee. These negative reactions then result in negative outcomes for the supervisor
and organization. Therefore, even though the supervisor may change the undesired
behavior with punishment, the punishment may lead to a more destructive behavior than
the original behavior being changed. The manager must find a way to use strong
punishments to change the undesirable behavior without causing the employee to
perceive the punishment as unfair. One possible way managers could use strong
punishments without causing negative reactions would be to administer a social account
to explain why this level o f punishment was given.
Employees want to know and to understand the reasons why they receive negative
outcomes. Managers often give social accounts to help explain the reasons for the
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negative outcomes employees receive. Social accounts are verbal explanations used by a
manager to increase employees’ acceptance of a negative outcome (Bies, 1987).
Individuals who receive a social account in conjunction with a negative outcome
consistently have been found to perceive the negative outcome as more fair compared to
those individuals not receiving a social account (Bies & Shapiro, 1987). Social accounts
may be helpful in reducing the negative side effects that accompany severe punishment,
thereby allowing severe punishment to change behavior without resulting in negative
reactions in the individual.
This thesis attempts to examine how two types o f social accounts (ideological and
causal) affect employees’ perceptions of a punishment’s fairness. Specifically, this
research attempts to show how managers can use these types o f social accounts to counter
the negative fairness perceptions and negative attitudes that accompany strong
punishments.
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Chapter 2
Review o f Organizational Justice Research
Three types o f fairness have been determined to affect individuals’ perceptions of
justice within organizational relationships: distributive justice, procedural justice and
interactional justice. Distributive justice theories focus on the perceived fairness
individuals place on outcome distributions. Procedural justice theories focus on the
perceived fairness o f the procedures enacted to make an outcome decision. Interactional
justice theories study the interpersonal relationship between the decision-maker and
receiver o f the outcome. Specifically, interactional fairness focuses on how the decision
maker’s treatment o f the employee during the enactment of the procedures affects the
employee’s perceptions o f fairness.
Distributive Justice
One o f the most well-established theories of distributive justice has been Adams’
(1965) equity theory. Equity theory states that individuals judge the fairness o f the
outcomes they receive by comparing their input/outcome ratio to the input/outcome ratio
o f a referent other. Individuals will perceive their outcomes as fair only when their
proportion o f inputs and outcomes equals the proportion of inputs and outcomes o f a
referent other. The importance o f a referent other used for making social comparisons
was a critical aspect o f this theory. Without a referent other against whom to compare
their inputs and outcomes, individuals cannot determine the fairness o f their outcome.
Equity only occurs when the two proportions are equal. Inequality between the two
proportions results in an individual feeling either anger (when the individual receives the
lower proportion) or guilt (when the individual receives the larger proportion).
Therefore, individuals are motivated to balance the equity equation by actually or
cognitively altering the referent other’s or their own inputs or outcomes.
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The evaluation that an individual makes about an outcome is based on his/her
perceptions o f outcome fairness. Specifically, Adams (1963) proposed that fairness is a
relative state. Fairness is influenced by what the individual perceives as the appropriate
rate o f outcomes for the services rendered, and inequity only results when the individual
psychologically judges his/her ratio o f inputs and outcomes as not meeting the inputs and
outcomes o f a referent other. As a result, managers can never know how outcomes will
affect the individual unless they are aware of the individual’s evaluative processes.
One assumption o f equity theory is that individuals with positive inequity also
work to restore equity. Individuals are motivated to restore equity even if the inequity is
in their favor. Adams (1963) examined how overcompensation would affect hourly and
piece-rate subjects’ quality o f work. He found that hourly overpaid subjects produced
greater quality, and piece-rate overpaid subjects produced greater quality and lower
quantity compared to the equitably paid subjects. Overpaid subjects altered their inputs
by increasing the work quality in order to increase the perceived equity. Despite the
motivation to balance positive inequity, positive inequity events result in motivational
force that is weaker than the motivational force during a negative inequity event
(Mowday, 1991).
Despite the frequent research support accumulated for equity theory, some major
limitations o f the theory have made its ability to predict fairness perceptions
questionable. First, the fundamental limitation o f this theory is its inability to predict
how the individual attempts to correct the inequity. The theory cannot predict whether
the individual cognitively distorts or physically changes his/her own or the referent
other’s inputs or outcomes. Additionally, researchers believe that how the individual
reduces inequity is dynamic and may not remain the same over time, resulting in more
uncertainty about how people correct inequity (Mowday, 1991). Finally, the theory
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cannot predict how the individual decides upon the referent against which to compare
his/her input/output ratio. Equity theory research has shown that people do care about the
fairness o f the outcomes they receive, but the limitations accompanying these theories
have pushed researchers to examine other areas of the outcome distribution event to
determine how individuals perceive fairness.
Procedural Justice
The limitations o f equity theory and the inability o f distributive justice to predict
individuals’ perceptions o f fairness in all situations has caused researchers to examine
other aspects o f organizational justice. More recently, researchers have begun to examine
how the procedures used to determine outcomes affect the individuals’ perceptions of
fairness. The fairness perceptions o f procedures used to determine outcomes are called
procedural justice. The theory o f procedural justice was developed by Thibaut and
Walker (1975) through a series o f studies on dispute-resolution procedures. Individuals
were given two types o f dispute-resolution procedures that differed in the type o f control
they had over the proceedings: process control - level of control disputants were offered
over the procedures used to settle the grievance, and decision control - the level of
control the individual had over the outcome decision.
Thibaut and Walker (1975) manipulated the process control by using autocratic
and inquisitional court styles. Participants were asked to evaluate a series o f grievance
cases that contained both autocratic and inquisitional court styles. In the autocratic
procedures, disputants had no control over the collection and presentation o f the evidence
for their case and also lacked influence in deciding the outcome of the grievance.
Therefore, individuals in the autocratic procedures held low process control and low
decision control. An inquisitional system allowed the disputants to gather information
and present their case, but it did not allow the disputant any decision control. Therefore,
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inquisitional procedures gave the disputants high procedural control and low decision
control. Disputants perceived the legal decision to be fairer, and they were more
accepting o f the decision when they were given process control (inquisitional procedures)
compared to when they were denied process control (autocratic procedures).
In an extension of Thibaut and Walker’s (1975, 1978) original work on
procedural justice theory, it was found that procedures are especially important to
perceptions o f fairness when the outcome is negative. This interaction has been called
the fair-process effect (Lind & Tyler, 1988). Specifically, the fair-process effect says that
procedures only affect perceptions of fairness when the outcome is negative. Outcomes
are more salient to people than procedures, thus outcomes are important in determining
fairness. As a result, there is no motivation to examine the fairness of the procedures if
the individual received a positive outcome. On the other hand, the individual who
receives a negative outcome is motivated to evaluate the fairness o f the procedures.
When the procedures are determined to be fair, the individual will evaluate a negative
outcome more favorably compared to individuals receiving unfair procedures. The fairprocess effect illustrates that “outcomes and procedures work together to form a sense of
injustice. A full understanding o f fairness cannot be achieved by examining the two
constructs separately. Rather, one needs to consider the interaction between outcomes
and procedures” (Cropanzano & Folger, 1991, p. 79). The fair-process effect has been
found regularly in organizational justice research across many different organizational
settings (Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996).
Many researchers have proposed that other procedural factors affect perceptions
o f procedural justice beyond that o f process control. Leventhal (1980) proposed six
procedural rules that people use to evaluate the perceptions o f outcome allocation
procedures. The six rules are: (a) consistency - allocating procedures should be

8

consistent across people and time; (b) bias suppression - personal self-interest and blind
allegiance to narrow preconceptions should be prevented; (c) accuracy - decisions should
be made on as much information as possible; (d) correctability - opportunities must exist
to modify and reverse decisions; (e) representativeness - the allocation process must
represent the concerns of all important subgroups and individuals; (f) ethicality - the
allocation process must be compatible with prevailing moral and ethical standards.
Leventhal’s (1980) work has provided evidence that people care about more than their
level o f process control when evaluating procedural fairness.
Recently, two models have been developed to explain why procedural justice
affects people. The self-interest model, also called the instrumental model, says that
people want fair procedures because fair procedures give the individuals an opportunity
to gain positive outcomes in the future. The group-value model attempts to explain
procedural justice in terms o f group identification (Lind & Tyler, 1988).
The self-interest model assumes that individuals are hedonistic and try to obtain
the most favorable outcomes. Individuals tend to be unaffected by short-term negative
outcomes if they feel optimistic about the likelihood o f receiving positive outcomes in the
future. Individuals evaluate the procedures in order to make inferences about their future
outcomes. Procedures that are fair and stable are more likely to result in future positive
outcomes if the outcomes are deserved. Unfair procedures may lead people to believe
that decisions are made arbitrarily, and therefore, people are less certain about the
probability o f receiving future positive outcomes.
The group-value model was developed out of the inability o f the self-interest
model to explain fully the effects o f procedures on reactions to allocation decisions (Lind
& Tyler, 1988). The group-value model was developed to explain the non-instrumental
effects o f procedures on perceptions o f fairness. The underlying assumption o f the
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group-value model is that people value their relationships in organizations. Social
relationships serve the function of impacting the individual’s self-esteem and selfidentity.
The procedures that decision-makers and organizations enact inform individuals
about their standing within the group. Individuals possess a set o f values that defines
how they should be treated, and when procedures do not match those values the
individuals will feel they have been treated procedurally unjustly. The perception of
procedural justice is based on an individual’s values and beliefs and is dynamic across
individuals. The model predicts that there are some values that all people possess
regardless o f idiosyncratic value differences; those values are the belief that one should
be treated with politeness, respect and dignity. Fairly treated individuals will feel more
respected and proud o f their group (Tyler, Degoey, & Smith, 1996). Unfair procedures
symbolize to the members the lack o f dignity and respect the organization has for them
(Tyler, 1994). Anger often accompanies procedural violations because the employees
feel that they have not been treated with the respect and dignity they deserved (Lind &
Tyler, 1988). In summary, the self-interest model implies that procedures are important
because they are a means to an end; the group-value model assumes that procedures are
important because they are an end in and of themselves (Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996).
Interactional Justice
An individual’s fairness perceptions are not restricted to distributive or procedural
events, but also include how the decision-maker treats the individual interpersonally.
Interactional justice is the quality o f interpersonal treatment individuals receive during
the enactment o f the procedures (Bies, 1987). The primary thrust of organizational
justice research has been confined to the impact of distributive and procedural justice on
employee reactions. More recently, researchers have begun to examine how
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interpersonal treatment affects employees’ perceptions of justice.
A study by Mikula, Petri, & Tanzer (1990) examined what types of events in
everyday life provoked feelings o f injustice. They proposed that people do not base
fairness perceptions solely on distributions of outcomes and enactments of procedures,
but that people also are cognizant of the interpersonal treatment by the decision-maker.
Participants were asked in an open-ended format to describe a recent unjust event. Many
o f the reported injustices did not concern distributive or procedural events, but instead
dealt with the manner in which the individual was interpersonally treated. The categories
o f behaviors that individuals found interpersonally unfair were (a) inconsiderate, impolite
or aggressive behavior; (b) treatment that violates personal dignity; and (c) acts that
indicate lack o f loyalty from the other person. The implication o f this study is that people
in their daily lives are aware o f their interpersonal treatment and perceive poor treatment
as unfair.
One criterion for examining interpersonal fairness is the manner in which the
decision maker communicates the procedures. In two studies (Bies & Moag, 1986), a
group o f MBA job candidates were asked to recount their reactions to a corporate
recruiting interview. In the first study, prior to participating in an interview, the MBA
students were asked to determine the fairness procedures that they expected the recruiter
to follow. Four communication criteria emerged: trustfulness, respect, propriety of
questions, and adequate justification. The MBA job candidates defined each of the
communication criteria as follows: trustfulness was the recruiter’s ability to be open and
honest; respect was shown by the recruiter refraining from rudeness or attacking
behaviors; impropriety of questions was defined as the candidates’ expectation that
recruiters would not ask improper questions; and adequate justification was defined as the
candidates’ expectation that they would receive an explanation for the decision.
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The second study used a critical incidents technique on another group of MBA
job candidates to gather incidents o f fair or unfair interview experiences (Bies & Moag,
1986). Candidates distinguished procedural criteria from interpersonal treatment in their
perceptions o f procedural fairness. The group o f MBA job candidates in this study
determined that the same four communication criteria found in Study 1 were important in
their perceptions o f fairness. In this second study, corporate recruiters who appeared
untrustworthy, displayed rude behavior, asked improper questions, or did not justify their
decisions were perceived as less fair. Therefore, the way procedures are communicated
to individuals affects their perceptions of fairness. Bies and Moag (1986) proposed that
fairness o f interpersonal treatment will be determined on an absolute standard and not via
the social comparison that is necessary for equity theory. Specifically, if a manager
treated you rudely, you could identify this as unfair treatment without comparing your
treatment to a referent’s treatment.
Reactions to Injustice
Organizational justice is studied prominently in organizational research because
the perceptions of injustice affect employees’ attitudes and job performance. Distributive
justice, procedural justice, and interactional justice must be studied to determine how
these injustices affect an individual’s attitudes (satisfaction with the supervisor,
satisfaction with the organization, organizational commitment, intentions to leave) or
behavior (retaliatory behaviors, organizational citizenship behaviors, job performance).
Researchers have consistently found that when situations are perceived as unfair, people
are less satisfied with the outcome and possess more negative perceptions of the event
(Folger & Konovsky, 1989; Greenberg, 1990a). Similar reactions have been found
across many organizational situations, and these reactions can have a profound negative
impact on the organization or the supervisor.
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Organizational justice research has examined how perceptions of injustice have
affected employees’ attitudes. Folger and Konovsky (1989) examined how distributive
and procedural justice influenced employees’ reactions to pay raise decisions.
Interestingly, the two forms o f justice did not have identical effects on people’s attitudes.
Distributive justice was found to influence satisfaction with pay, while procedural justice
had a significant impact on employees’ trust in the manager and organizational
commitment. This research has shown that perceptions of outcome and procedure
fairness do not result in identical reactions for the individual.
Perceptions of injustice will not only affect individuals’ reactions, but also their
performance. In a selection context, Gilliland (1994) examined whether distributive and
procedural justice would affect employees’ reactions to the selection system. In this
laboratory experiment, a group o f participants were either selected or rejected for a paid
employment opportunity. The procedural variables were job-relatedness o f the selection
criteria and explanations given for the outcome decision. Individuals who were accepted
for the paid position based on job-related criteria were better performers than individuals
who were accepted based on non-job related criteria. Additionally, when the participant
was rejected for the job, receiving an explanation influenced whether the individual
applied for participation in a similar study or recommended a similar project to others.
This study shows that perceptions of injustice not only can affect an individual’s attitudes
about the outcome and process but also can affect how the individual performs on the job.
If perceptions o f justice can influence how an individual performs, then it may also affect
other behaviors such as retaliatory behaviors.
Injustice in the workplace can bring about many undesirable effects, such as
anger, resentment, avoidance, and retaliation. Unfair managers fail to treat subordinates
with dignity and respect, and individuals treated without dignity and respect retaliate for
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this value violation with “reciprocal deviance” (Kemper, 1966). Reciprocal deviance
refers to the manager treating employees unfairly, and the employees reciprocating this
unfair treatment by acting against the manager or organization in a destructive manner.
Greenberg (1990a) attempted to study the conditions under which employees
retaliate during times o f underpayment. More specifically, Greenberg wanted to know
how an adequate or inadequate explanation for a pay cut would affect the employees’
theft behavior. The adequate explanation was believed to represent higher level of
procedural fairness than the inadequate explanation. Employees who were given an
inadequate explanation were found to steal more from the organization than were the
employees who received adequate explanations. This finding implies that levels o f overt
retaliatory behavior increase when the individual perceives the situation as procedurally
unjust.
Unlike the overt retaliatory behaviors of stealing that occurred in Greenberg’s
(1990a) study, people can react to injustices with more covert retaliatory behaviors to
punish the organization. Organizational Retaliatory Behaviors (ORBs) are subtle
retaliations that decrease the efficiency o f the organization. In Skarlicki and Folger
(1997), these behaviors included wasting company material, calling in sick when not ill,
disobeying supervisor’s instructions, failing to give coworkers required information, just
to name a few. Skarlicki and Folger (1997) predicted that ORBs would increase when
perceptions o f injustice were high. They found that when distributive, procedural and
interactional justice were perceived to be low, the number of retaliatory behaviors was
the highest.
In summary, research has found that perceptions of injustice influence attitudes,
performance, and retaliatory behaviors. These cognitive and behavioral reactions to the
injustice have financial and motivational implications for the organization, and as a
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result, managers must find a way to increase employees’ perceptions of justice in spite of
the finite resources within organizations. One way that managers have begun managing
the impressions o f outcomes within organizations has been with the use o f social
accounts (Greenberg, 1988).
Social Accounts
People who feel that they have been treated unfairly will feel morally outraged,
and this results in feelings o f anger and frustration (Bies, 1987). Managers must find
some method to manage the impressions of the situation’s fairness so that employees do
not experience these emotions in the face o f unfair outcomes. Much of the recent
research has examined how social accounts reduce the negative reactions people
experience when outcomes are perceived to be unfair. A social account can be defined as
a verbal strategy that a decision-maker can use to minimize the severity of the decision or
to convince the individual that the wrongful act was not truly what the decision-maker
was “really like” as a person (Bies, 1987). The impact of social accounts may be the
result o f people’s need to understand the situations affecting them. People have been
characterized as “intuitive jurists,” meaning that they want to know the specific reasons
for an apparent injustice so that they can judge whether they have been treated fairly
(Bies, 1987). The four types o f social accounts that managers can use are: (a) causal, (b)
ideological, (c) referential, and (d) penitential.
A causal account is an explanation that attempts to reduce the perceived
responsibility o f the decision-maker for the injustice. Causal accounts are often referred
to as excuses. The most common way for managers to reduce their responsibility for the
outcome would be to claim mitigating circumstances caused the injustice, or more
specifically, the injustice was not the decision maker’s fault. For example, “My boss told
me I had to punish you for performing poorly.” In essence, the decision-maker is
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pointing out through the social account that another decision-maker would make the same
decision, and therefore, the employee should not feel negatively towards him/her.
An ideological account attempts to legitimize the action by putting the action in
the larger organizational framework. An ideological account is also referred to as a
justification. The decision-maker acknowledges his/her responsibility for the decision by
explaining that the decision was the “right thing to do.” Managers enacting ideological
accounts do so by appealing to superordinate goals or labeling the decision in more
value-laden terms. Through the use o f superordinate goals and invoking value-laden
terms, the decision-maker hopes to change the victim’s schema used to evaluate the
injustice (Bies, 1987). An example might be a manager who tells a punished subordinate
that the punishment was necessary to put him/her on the right track so that the team can
be more efficient.
Referential accounts influence perceptions of injustice by comparing employee’s
treatment or outcomes to the treatment or outcomes that others have received. There are
three basic types o f referential accounts: (a) social, (b) temporal, and (c) aspirational.
The social type uses social comparison information to point out to the individual that
his/her outcomes are not as bad as others’ outcomes. The temporal type provides the
person with information that suggests that the situation will be better in the future.
Finally, the aspirational type explains to the individual that his/her original expectations
are unrealistic and helps to change his/her expectations.
A penitential account, commonly referred to as an apology, is an expression of
remorse by the harm-doer for the negative outcome. Penitential accounts represent an
enactment o f self-retribution as a partial payment for the injustice that has occurred (Bies,
1987). As a result o f such partial payments, the manager expects the victim to see
him/her more favorably.
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Researchers have found an extensive amount of experimental support for the use
of social accounts for impression-management purposes. Researchers have most often
examined the mitigating effects of causal accounts. One of the first systematic studies of
causal accounts was performed as part of three studies by Bies and Shapiro (1987). In
Study 1 the participants o f the laboratory experiment were given a scenario that explained
how their supervisor had used his subordinate’s idea to gain recognition from the top
management. Participants either received or did not receive a causal account explaining
the reason why the subordinate’s idea was used. The participants were then asked to act
as an arbitrator for the case. Participants judged the interactional fairness and
appropriateness o f the managerial decision to be higher when a causal account was given
as a justification for the manager’s conduct.
Study 2 attempted to replicate the above-mentioned findings of Study 1 in the
context o f a sales purchase decision and a budget proposal decision. Participants were
given one o f two contextual scenarios. In the sales context, the salesperson received a
smaller than expected sale; in the budget context, a manager received a smaller than
requested budget. This study supported the findings from Study 1 in that interactional
fairness and acceptance o f the managerial decision was higher when a causal account was
given. More importantly, this study found that in order for the causal account to be
effective, it must be perceived as adequate.
Study 3 attempted to replicate the findings of the previous laboratory studies in a
field setting and also examined how causal accounts influenced the judgments of
procedural fairness. Participants were asked to recount an incident when they had a
proposal or policy rejected by their boss. They were then asked to measure the adequacy
o f the account, interactional fairness, procedural fairness, approval o f the boss, and
affective reactions. The results replicated the previous findings of Studies 1 and 2 in the
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field setting. In addition, only adequate causal accounts were found to influence
perceptions o f procedural justice. The conclusion was made that adequacy o f the causal
account, rather than the claim o f the account, was what impacted the perceptions o f
interactional and procedural justice.
An empirical review of the state of social account research by Bies and Sitkin
(Bies, 1989; Bies & Sitkin, 1992; Sitkin & Bies, 1993) has found that many variables
influence the effects o f social accounts. The most frequently examined characteristic that
influences a social account’s effectiveness is adequacy. A series of studies by Folger and
his colleagues (Folger & Martin, 1986; Folger, Rosenfield, & Robinson, 1983) found that
adequate accounts were required when reward distribution procedures were changed. In
the study by Folger et al. (1983), participants took part in a winner-take-all competition in
which the procedures for distributing the outcomes were set before the start o f the
competition. At the end o f the competition, all participants were informed that they had
lost the competition because the procedures for outcome distribution had changed.
Participants who received adequate explanations for the change in procedure expressed
less discontent for the decision.
In Folger & Martin’s (1986) follow-up study, participants were denied a favorable
outcome because o f the boss’s actions, and an adequate or inadequate reason was given
for the decision. The authors found that participants were more accepting o f the decision
when an adequate explanation was given. Specifically, participants were less resentful
and more willing to recommend the experimenter for a permanent job as a research
assistant when adequate accounts were used to legitimize the boss’s decision.
In a field study, Bies, Shapiro, and Cummings (1988) attempted to determine how
causal accounts would affect an individual’s reaction to a rejection of a proposal or
request. The participants were asked to recount a specific incident in which the boss
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rejected a request. The variables measured in the study were predicted to result in
conflict within the organization (anger, disapproval with the boss, and complaints to
higher-ups). As found in previously cited studies, adequacy o f the account was
negatively correlated with the negative reactions to the decision. As a result, when an
account was given, negative outcomes had less impact on variables that caused
organizational conflict.
Interestingly, this study was one of the first to look beyond adequacy in
determining the effectiveness o f causal accounts. Support was also found for the
importance o f the boss’s sincerity in communicating the account. Therefore, the study
found that people take into consideration both the adequacy and sincerity o f the account,
instead o f simply the claim o f mitigating circumstances, when making their affective
reactions to the injustice.
Additionally, the content of the account was found to be important. Managers
were found to communicate many types of mitigating circumstances when using causal
accounts, but they were not perceived to be equal by employees. Accounts focusing on
company norms, budget constraints, or formal company policies were perceived to be
more adequate than those focused on employee behavior, upper management, or political
environment. The authors concluded that mitigating circumstances that focus on
impersonal criteria would be perceived as more adequate. The implication from this
study is that many variables besides adequacy may influence the effectiveness of social
accounts.
In a series o f three studies, Shapiro, Buttner, & Barry (1994) examined a set of
variables that were predicted to affect the perceived adequacy o f an account. Study 1
examined how perceived concern, perceived reasonableness, and outcome severity
affected an explanation’s perceived adequacy. Participants were instructed to recall an
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interview with both a company they strongly desired to join and a company they did not
desire to join. Outcome severity was manipulated by including groups that strongly
desired to join the company and a group that did not desire to join the company. The
perceived concern o f the decision-maker was not found to affect adequacy significantly,
but the perceived reasonableness of the explanation did affect perceived adequacy.
Therefore, the substance o f the explanation may be more important to the perceived
adequacy than the manner in which it is communicated. Additionally, situational
variables such as the severity o f the outcome also affected the adequacy of the account.
The greater the severity of the outcome, the more difficult it was for an explanation to be
perceived as adequate. Thus, explanations were more effective when the outcome
severity was low. In conclusion, the adequacy o f an account was affected by the message
o f the account and the level of outcome severity.
Study 3 examined how an explainer’s sincerity, an explanation’s specificity, and
outcome severity interacted to influence the perceived adequacy o f the explanation.
Individuals in the high specificity condition received specific personalized information,
while the low specificity condition received a small amount o f impersonal information.
The high sincerity condition contained a personalized letter (with a personalized
signature) expressing concern, understanding, and an offer for help; while the low
sincerity condition did not. Participants in the high severity condition were told that the
failing grade they received came in a required class, and as a result, they would not
graduate that semester. In the low severity condition, the participants were allowed to
graduate because the failing grade was not in a required class. An unexpected two-way
interaction emerged between sincerity and specificity: adequacy was the highest when
sincerity and specificity were the highest. Therefore, an explanation’s adequacy was
affected by both the explanation’s content and the manner in which the explanation was
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communicated. Interestingly, this study did not replicate the low-severity effect found in
Study 1.
Social accounts have been found to mitigate the negative reactions to injustice
outside the laboratory setting. Greenberg (1990a), as previously mentioned, studied how
employee theft behavior would be affected by the implementation of an adequate
account. Employees in three different plants had their salary cut by 15%. Employees
were given either an adequate explanation (president o f the company explained in detail
the reasons for the decision and answered questions) or an inadequate explanation
(president o f the company gave no explanation and answered no questions). Employees
who received an inadequate explanation stole significantly more than they did prior to the
pay reduction. Additionally, employees who received an adequate explanation also stole
more than they did prior to the pay-cut. However, employees who received an adequate
explanation stole less than the employees who received inadequate explanations. As a
result, explanations were more effective than no explanations at reducing negative
reactions, but they were not as effective as giving fair outcomes. During the pay
reduction period, the inadequate explanation group had significantly more theft behavior
than did the adequate explanation group. The implication of this study is that employers
should distribute fair outcomes whenever possible, but when the fair distribution is not
possible, the next most effective solution is to give an adequate explanation for the
outcome.
Bies and Shapiro (1988) used two studies to examine how voice opportunities and
a managerial justification would interact to influence perceptions o f procedural justice.
In a laboratory setting, Study 1 examined how procedures that allowed no voice or voice
and receiving an account or no account would affect an individual’s reactions to a job
recruitment decision. Participants read a description o f an interview procedure that the
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job candidate went through where the job candidate was given either voice or no voice
opportunity and a rejection letter that contained either justification or no justification for
the decision. Voice and justification were shown to have independent effects on
perceptions o f procedural justice. If voice and justifications have independent effects,
then it might be possible to use social accounts to increase perceptions o f fairness even if
other procedural variables are unjust.
Study 2 attempted to replicate the findings of Study 1 in the context of a
budgetary decision. Participants were asked to describe a recent rejection o f a budget
request by their boss. The presence or absence o f a voice opportunity was measured on a
7-point scale by one criterion, “opportunity to persuade your boss by fully presenting
your position.” Additionally, two items were used to measure the presence or absence of
an account; “boss attempted to provide justification” and “boss claimed that the
circumstances were beyond his or her control”. Study 2 found that people perceived
voice procedures as fairer than mute procedures, and justification situations as fairer than
nonjustification situations for unfair budget decision-making as well as unfair job
recruitment situations. These two studies show that justifications have an effect on
perceptions o f fairness even when procedures are unjust.
The social accounts literature has supported the impact o f both causal accounts
and an account’s perceived adequacy on employees’ reactions to injustice. Despite the
overwhelming support for using causal accounts provided by these studies, only one
study was found that compared the effectiveness of two different types of accounts in the
same study. Bobocel and Farrell (1996) examined the influence o f both ideological and
causal accounts on white males’ perceptions of interactional fairness in the context of an
Affirmative Action decision. The authors tested two hypotheses: (a) interactional
fairness would be highest in the ideological account condition, when the employer takes
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responsibility for the decision and provides a justification legitimizing the decision; and
(b) adequacy would be a partial mediator o f the relationship between the social accounts
and interactional fairness. The authors proposed that ideological accounts would increase
the white males’ perceptions of interactional fairness. In an ideological account, the
decision-maker assumes responsibility and attempts to justify the decision for the
outcome. Since the underlying goal o f the ideological account is to legitimize the
outcome by appealing to a superordinate goal, the reasoning for the received outcome
will be perceived as objective rather than arbitrary. Causal accounts, on the other hand,
claim that the outcome was due to mitigating circumstances and may not have been seen
as a viable explanation for the outcome. Casual accounts will be seen as more arbitrary
than ideological accounts (Bobocel & Farrell, 1996).
Ideological accounts were found to increase perceptions o f interactional fairness
more than the causal or no account conditions. Surprisingly, causal accounts were not
even as effective at increasing interactional fairness as the no account condition. Based
on this study’s findings then, it could be concluded that causal accounts may not be as
effective as providing no account at all. The overwhelming support for causal accounts
in previous research, however, make this bold conclusion inappropriate.
The second hypothesis o f this study (adequacy would partially mediate the
account’s impact on interactional fairness) was also supported. After adequacy was
controlled for, the overall variance accounted for by the account conditions was reduced
from 16% to 10% . Therefore, adequacy partially mediates the effect of social accounts,
but the accounts may also have their own unique effect. Bobocel and Farrell (1996)
concluded, “there must be something more than just adequacy that contributes to the
participant’s ratings of interactional fairness in the ideological account condition” (p. 28).
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Additionally, ideological accounts may be more effective because of their ability
to signal respect for the employee, something causal accounts may not be able to do. For
example, an explanation in which the decision-maker takes responsibility for his/her
actions and appeals to a superordinate goal presumably conveys more respect and dignity
than does an explanation that denies responsibility and blames the outcome on mitigating
circumstances. Therefore, the group-value model may help explain the difference in the
fairness-enhancing effects o f the ideological account over the causal account.
Interaction o f Outcome Severity and Social Accounts
Outcome severity is a variable that also has been found to affect the relationship
between social accounts and an individual’s fairness perceptions. In Folger and
Cropanzano’s (1998) model o f social accounts, outcome severity was predicted to
moderate this social account-outcome fairness relationship. Research has found support
for two different effects o f outcome severity: the high-severity effect and the lowseverity effect. The low-severity effect states that the social account is most effective
(that is, more able to reduce perceived injustice and negative reactions) when the
outcome is relatively mild. Specifically, an account is less effective when the individual
receives an extremely negative outcome, and most effective when the individual is
impacted minimally by the outcomes. Therefore, small problems are easier for managers
to explain away than large ones (Folger & Cropanzano, 1998).
Three studies have provided support for the low-severity effect. First, as
mentioned in the prior section, Shapiro et al. (1994) found that social accounts were
perceived to be more adequate when the outcomes received were less damaging
compared to outcomes that were more damaging. Maier and Lavrakas (1976) examined
when individuals would be receptive to an apology for a co-worker’s lie. Individuals
would accept the apology more readily when the co-worker’s lie did not cost them much
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money, therefore rendering the lie less costly to them. Finally, Johnson and Rule (1986)
examined individuals’ reactions to being severely or mildly insulted. Individuals who
received severe insults were found to be less accepting o f the social account, while
individuals who received mild insults viewed the account in a more accepting manner.
These studies support the low-severity effect prediction that social accounts have a more
positive impact when the outcome received is less damaging to the individual.
The high-severity effect states that accounts are most effective when the outcome
is most severe. The high-severity effect elicits a similar interaction as the fair-process
effect (discussed in the procedural justice section): when outcomes are negative,
procedures are used to determine fairness. Therefore, in situations in which outcomes are
perceived as severely negative, a social account is needed to mitigate the damaging
effects o f the situation. Greenberg (1994) garnered the high-severity effect in a study that
examined heavy-, light- and non-smokers’ reactions to a smoking ban. Heavy smokers
were perceived to be most affected by the implementation of a smoking ban, and thus
were predicted to perceive the smoking ban as most severe. As predicted, heavy smokers
did find the smoking ban more harmful. Greenberg found that when the heavy smokers
were given an adequate explanation for the smoking ban, however, they had the biggest
change in their acceptance o f the smoking ban compared to the light- and non-smokers.
Cropanzano and Konovsky (1995) examined how different levels o f perceived
severity would affect an employee’s perceptions of the fairness of an employee drug
screening. A severe outcome condition in this study was defined as a person who, after
being tested positive for drug use, was treated like a criminal; the mild outcome condition
was defined as a person who, after being tested positive for drug use, was given
rehabilitation for their addiction. The authors found that when little justification was
given for treating the individual like a criminal, perceptions o f drug testing fairness were
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low, but when high justification was given, a higher perception o f drug testing fairness
resulted.
One reason for the increased effectiveness of social accounts in the high-severity
condition may be that an explanation helps a person understand the reasons for the harsh
outcome. Conversely, when the outcome is weak and not perceived to be severe, there is
no reason for people to change their attitudes toward the outcome, both because the
outcome has no real effect on them and because the punishment is not seen as unjust.
The harsh outcome, on the other hand, does have a strong effect on the individual;
without some reasoning for the punishment, the individual can only see the outcome as
unfair.
Finally, Folger and Cropanzano (1998) proposed that the severity of the outcome
has a curvilinear effect on the effectiveness o f the social accounts. By a curvilinear
relationship the authors mean that when the outcome severity is low, the social account
may not be needed to change the perceptions of the injustice because this outcome does
not affect the employee and is not seen as unjust. As the outcome severity increases, the
individual becomes more emotionally distraught by the outcome, and the social account
may help lessen the emotional reactions. The outcome severity may hit a certain
threshold, at which point the social account becomes effective at mitigating the effects of
the injustice. Finally, if outcome severity became too severe, the individual may perceive
the outcome as extremely unjust and may perceive an explanation as inadequate for
justifying the negative outcome he/she received. Thus, merely an explanation for the
extremely severe outcome is not enough to exonerate the injustice.
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Chapter 3
Review o f Punishment Research
Punishment as a concept has been studied for many decades, but not much of this
research has been conducted in organizational settings. Punishment within an
organizational context can be defined as a superior’s application of a negative
consequence or removal o f a positive consequence following a subordinate’s undesirable
behaviors (Butterfield, Trevino, & Ball, 1996). Subordinates’ undesirable behaviors take
two forms: poor performance and antisocial behavior.
Wheeler (1976) reviewed 339 arbitration cases reported in the Law Arbitration
Report between 1970 and 1974 and classified the cases into categories based on the types
o f offenses or undesirable behaviors that were punished. The categories that emerged
were the following: (a) absenteeism, tardiness, leaving early; (b) dishonesty, theft,
falsification o f records; (c) incompetence, negligence, poor workmanship, violation of
safety regulations; (d) illegal strikes, strike violence, deliberate restriction o f production;
(e) intoxication, bringing intoxicant to work; (f) fighting, horseplay, troublemaking; (g)
insubordination, refusal o f job assignment, refusal to work overtime, fights or altercations
with supervisor; (h) miscellaneous rule violations.
Robinson and Greenberg (1998) defined six different types o f antisocial behavior,
including (a) workplace deviance; (b) antisocial behavior; (c) employee vice; (d)
organizational misbehavior; (e) workplace aggression; (f) non-complaint behavior.
Managers want to eliminate poor performance and antisocial behavior from their
organizations because o f the economic and motivational effects these behaviors have on
the organization.
Robinson and Greenberg (1998) cite five organizational statistics that clearly
illustrate the detrimental effects o f antisocial behavior and poor performance: (a)
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seventy-five percent o f employees have stolen from their employers at least once; (b)
from one-third to three-quarters o f all employees have engaged in some type o f fraud,
vandalism, or sabotage in their workplaces; (c) forty-two percent o f women have
experienced sexual harassment at the workplace; (d) almost twenty-five percent of
employees have admitted knowledge of illegal drug use among employees; and (e) seven
percent o f employees have been threatened with physical violence while on the job.
These statistics illustrate the extensive nature of poor performance and antisocial
behavior occurring within organizations. These behaviors create a damaging economic
effect on the organization through theft, vandalism and poor performance; these
behaviors can also impact morale and indirectly affect the company’s profits. Individuals
who are sexually harassed or threatened with violence may decrease satisfaction and
commitment to the company which may result in their decreasing work performance or
leaving the company. Therefore, it is in a manager’s best interest to find an effective way
to eliminate or change the undesirable behaviors.
Much o f the study o f punishment has examined the most effective methods to
change behavior, and specifically, how different levels of punishment severity affect
individuals’ likelihood o f changing undesirable behaviors. Bennett (1998) proposed that
there are two consequences o f punishment: (a) it will change behavior and (b) it will
result in negative side effects in the punished individual. First, the conditions under
which punishments will change behaviors will be discussed.
Impact o f Punishment on Undesired Behaviors
Before attempting to determine the conditions under which punishment is most
effective, it is important to determine if punishment has been found to change behaviors
at all. Kempen and Hall (1977) attempted to control absenteeism behavior by using a
system o f both rewards and punishments. Positive reinforcement was differentially
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applied, that is, employees received positive reinforcement for regular attendance, and
employees with poor attendance received punishment. The results found that after this
system was implemented the level of absenteeism decreased. Similar results for a mixed
discipline system were also found by Kopelman and Schneller (1982). The authors
attempted to use this system to control the amount of overtime and unscheduled absences
for medical center employees. This system resulted in a 54% decrease in the amount of
overtime and significantly decreased the amount of unscheduled absences. From these
two studies, it can be concluded that a system that combines both rewards and
punishments to change undesirable behaviors is effective, but how effective can
punishment be at changing undesirable behavior if it is used by itself?
Baum and Youngblood (1975) examined the effects of a classroom attendance
policy in which the students were punished for missing classes. Punishment was found to
increase the level o f attendance behavior over that of the no punishment condition.
Additionally, punishment also has been found to decrease unethical behavior, even if the
unethical behavior is being reinforced (Hegarty & Sims, 1978). Punishment can
therefore have a very powerful effect on changing employees’ undesirable behaviors.
Brass and Oldham (1976) examined supervisors’ use o f punishment as a
motivational tool to increase employees’ work performance and motivation. They found
that Personally Rewarding and Personally Punishing motivational strategies were
positively related to eight measures o f employee effectiveness. Personally Punishing
strategies were significantly related to 7 of the 8 measures of effectiveness, while
Personally Rewarding strategies were only related to 3 of the 8 measures of effectiveness.
These results show that punishment can be as effective or even more effective than
reward allocations at increasing the effectiveness o f employees. In summary, research
has shown that punishments are effective both when delivered in combination with
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rewards and when delivered by themselves. Despite all the literature examining the
effects of punishment on undesirable behaviors, little research has examined the
conditions under which punishment is most effective at changing undesirable behaviors.
Punishment Severity
Thus far, the majority of the research on punishment has looked at how the
severity o f punishments affects levels of performance. Severity of punishment appears to
be a very important variable that affects behavioral change, but studies of punishment
have not produced consistent results. One recurring finding has been that more intense
punishments result in the greatest amount of behavioral change (Church, 1963; Johnston,
1972; Skinner, 1953; Walters & Grusac, 1977).
From his work within a therapy setting, Johnston (1972) outlined ten guidelines
for effectively changing behaviors through punishment. Two of the guidelines dealt with
the severity o f punishment. First, Johnston proposed that the initial intensity o f the
punishment should be as powerful as possible, and that this level of punishment should
be administered for as long as possible. Second, he suggested that if only a moderate
level o f punishment could be administered, then long periods of the punishment should
be used. Thus, from this research it could be concluded that the most effective way to
change undesirable behaviors was through the administration of the most severe
punishment possible. Researchers who find support for the use of strong punishments
reason that more intense punishment suppresses behaviors because individuals do not
want to be given this level of punishment again (Church, 1963; Johnston, 1972; Skinner,
1953; Walters & Grusac, 1977). They also hypothesize that weaker punishment will be
ineffective at deterring undesirable behaviors because this level of punishment will have
no dire consequences for the individual.
Bennett (1998) found that behavioral change was related to the level of outcome
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severity. Participants who were given less severe punishments were less likely to change
their behaviors compared to those who were given more severe punishments. Bennett
concluded that the low levels o f punishment did not act as a deterrent to performing the
undesirable behavior, and simply the act of applying punishment was not enough to
change the behavior. The implication from this study is that in order for the punishment
to be effective, it must be intense.
In contrast, a second finding has been that the level of punishment severity was
irrelevant to the amount o f behavioral change (Leon, 1981; Rimm & Masters, 1979). It
was proposed by Leon (1981) that the application of the punishment was what caused the
behavioral change and not the punishment’s level of intensity. In other words, low levels
o f punishment would bring about exactly the same amount o f behavior change as would
moderately or extremely intense punishments. Little additional empirical evidence has
been found to support these findings.
The third possible relationship between punishment severity and performance
change states that a moderate level o f punishment severity may be most effective in
changing undesirable behaviors. Avery and Ivancevich (1980), in a commentary
regarding the state o f punishment research in organizations, reasoned that punishment can
only be effective in changing behaviors at a moderate intensity level. They surmised that
if the punishment were too intense compared to the undesirable behavior, then the
employee would become so upset that he/she would not feel obligated to change that
behavior. For example, an employee who is suspended for one week after being tardy
once would probably perceive the punishment as extremely unfair, and he/she would not
attempt to change this behavior. On the other hand, if the punishment is not harsh
enough, the individual would not view the punishment as a deterrent and would thus
continue to perform the undesirable behavior. A moderate level o f punishment would be
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strong enough to deter the behavior from occurring, but not too intense to cause
resentment and not too weak to result in a lack o f change in behavior.
Currently, no studies have been found to support Avery and Ivancevich’s
prediction. Additionally, none o f the studies cited in my study specifically examined
how the individual receiving the punishment perceived its severity. Severity is a relative
state, so it is essential for researchers to determine at what levels people perceive
punishment as high, medium or low. Authors have not commented on how high levels of
punishments have been defined; is a high level of punishment synonymous with severe
punishments, or are high-level punishments simply more intense than an appropriately
intense punishment. In these other studies, the label the authors placed on certain levels
of punishment may have misrepresented the perceived level o f punishment the
individuals received. If high-intensity punishments are defined as severe punishments,
then Avery and Ivancevich’s proposal may be valid, and high punishments would
decrease behavior change. On the other hand, if high punishment is not defined as
severe, then high punishments may increase behavior change.
Empirical evidence has shown that punishment can be effective in changing
employees’ undesirable behaviors, but much of the management literature instructs
supervisors to eliminate punishment from their disciplinary system. The reason for the
push to eliminate punishment from organizations is because o f the perceived negative
side effects o f the punishment on the individual.
Negative Outcomes o f Punishment
The second part o f Bennett’s (1998) proposed consequences of punishment was
that punishment resulted in negative consequences for the punished. The belief by most
researchers has been that punishment causes the victim to develop anger, resentment,
avoidance, and retaliatory behaviors towards the punishing agent; in an organizational
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context, the punishing agent would be the supervisor or the organization (Luthans, 1995;
Moorehead & Griffin, 1995; Northcraft & Neale, 1994; Organ & Hammer, 1983). Avery
and Ivancevich (1980) reviewed previous punishment research studies and concluded that
punishment will result in anxiety, aggressive acts, passivity, and withdrawal.
Additionally, punishment may lead to escape or avoidance by the victim. These
behaviors could have a detrimental effect on the supervisor-subordinate relationship.
Parke (1972) found that undesirable side effects were only manifested when the
individual was punished indiscriminately or harshly. Therefore, negative side effects
occurred only when the punishment was not contingent on the behavior or the
punishment was too severe compared to the punishable behavior.
More recent studies have continued to examine individuals’ reactions to the
presentation o f punishment within an organizational setting. Baron (1988) compared the
reactions o f individuals receiving destructive criticism against individuals receiving
constructive criticism. Participants in the study were instructed to develop a company’s
ad campaign for a new line of shampoo that would be introduced soon. Participants were
either given constructive criticism in which the comments about the ad campaign were
specific in content and considerate in tone, and no attributions were made about the
reasons for the poor performance and no threats were made; or destructive criticism in
which participants received general remarks in which the comments were inconsiderate,
attributed the poor performance to the individual, and threatened the individual.
Destructive criticism had a profound effect on the participant’s emotional and behavioral
reactions. Individuals receiving destructive criticism were more inflexible to the
suggestions, showed more avoidance, felt angrier, felt tenser, and were less likely to
collaborate. The implication o f this study is that severe punishments have a negative
emotional effect on the victim, and thus will result in behaviors that are detrimental to the
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organization.
Ball, Trevino, and Sims (1994) examined how fair and unfair punishments
affected employee performance and citizenship behaviors. Recently punished employees
from 20 different organizations were asked to complete a questionnaire about the
punishment event. Harsh punishments were found to have a strong impact on subsequent
performance and retaliatory behaviors. When the punishment was perceived to be overly
harsh, employees rated the anticitizenship measure significantly higher than the
organizational citizenship measure, which meant that the individual was more likely to
have covertly retaliated since the punishment incident’s occurrence. Some examples of
items included in the anticitizenship measure included: lying in order to get the boss into
trouble, sabotaging the work o f co-workers, and purposely interfering with someone else
doing his/her job. Additionally, this study found that when punishment was too harsh,
individuals were less likely to change their own behaviors. The performance measure
examined the extent to which the individual’s work performance had taken a turn for the
better and/or whether the individual had stopped performing the undesirable behaviors.
Therefore, this measure tapped both types o f punishable behaviors: poor performance
and antisocial behaviors. The importance of this study is that it illustrated that overly
severe punishments have had a detrimental effect on the performance that managers were
trying to eliminate or change and have resulted in retaliatory behavior.
In summary, punishments do have negative side effects on individuals. The side
effects often include anger, resentment, avoidance and retaliation. These side effects are
especially evident when the punishment is extremely severe, yet most of the punishment
literature found that highly severe punishments are needed to change behavior
effectively. In this dilemma lies the paradox o f punishment. Managers can change the
behaviors they find undesirable, but new negative emotions and behaviors may occur as a
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result o f the punishment needed to change the original unwanted behavior. In order for
punishment to be a successful method o f changing behavior, managers must use
punishment in a way that changes behaviors without producing the negative side effects.
An exciting avenue to explore to solve this dilemma is to examine individuals’
perceptions o f justice during punishment incidents.
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Chapter 4
Punishment and Organizational Justice
One organizational context that has not been extensively studied via justice theory
has been organizational punishment (Avery & Jones, 1985). Very few studies have
examined how individuals perceive the fairness o f punishment events. Greenberg
(1990b) proposed that a very promising avenue o f research would be to apply procedural
justice theory to issues o f employee discipline.
Sampson (1986) proposed that individuals see punishment through the eyes of
justice. If people cognitively evaluate punishment in terms o f fairness, then people
should have the same reactions to unfair punishment as they do to unfair reward
allocations. It does appear plausible that people evaluate the fairness o f punishment
events as they do reward allocations because both outcomes, when unfair, elicit negative
reactions from the recipients. Unfair reward allocations and punishment cause people to
react with negative attitudes (lower commitment, lower satisfaction), negative emotions
(anger), poorer performance, and/or retaliatory behaviors. Previous research on fairness
and reward allocation research has found that people will perceive the outcome as fair
even if it was negative as long as fair procedures were used. Therefore, a similar
application o f procedural justice may affect an individual’s perception of a punishment’s
fairness. In particular, certain types of social accounts may be effective at eliminating the
negative side effects of punishment.
Much o f the introductory research examining the effects o f procedural justice
variables on reactions to punishment has studied aspects of punishment consistency.
Consistency o f outcome decisions is a procedural justice variable proposed by Leventhal
(1980). If this procedural variable affected individuals’ perceptions of fairness, then the
possibility exists that other procedural variables may also affect individuals’ perceptions
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o f fairness. Avery, Davis, and Nelson (1984) surveyed a group o f refinery workers about
their perceptions o f their supervisors’ discipline behaviors. Particularly, they wanted to
know how the disciplinary behavior affected job satisfaction. The results support their
hypothesis that people who are given consistent punishments have a greater level of job
satisfaction than people who are given inconsistent punishments. The authors also found
that when the punishment was administered in an inappropriate manner - childishly, in a
petty manner, or in an angry fashion - job satisfaction was decreased. Unfortunately, this
study did not examine the perceived level o f fairness, so no conclusion can be made
about whether consistency affects perceptions of fairness, but based on its effect on job
satisfaction, consistency should have an effect on procedural justice.
Bennett and Cummings (1991) examined how the schedule o f punishment
affected people’s performance on a proofreading task. Procedural justice theory
hypothesizes that aversive consequences delivered on a fixed ratio or continuous
schedule results in fewer undesirable behaviors than would a variable ratio schedule. The
authors found that continuous punishment and a fixed ratio schedule of punishment did
not significantly differ in the number of errors they produced, but the fixed ratio group
had significantly fewer errors than the variable ratio group. Unlike much of the early
punishment literature that suggested that in order to be effective, punishment must be
administered after each incident (Azrin & Holtz, 1966; Johnston, 1972; Parke, 1972), this
study demonstrated that punishments will be effective as long as they are on a consistent
schedule.
Bennett (1998) used two in-basket exercises to determine if punishment could be
used to change behavior without causing negative side effects (anger and retaliation).
Bennett examined how the magnitude and consistency o f punishments for giving
distributors kickbacks would affect behavior change, anger, and retaliatory behaviors.
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Interestingly, the magnitude o f the punishment influenced the level of behavior change,
while the consistency didn’t, thus supporting the contention in previous literature that
high magnitude punishments are needed to change behavior. Both consistency and
magnitude had a significant effect on levels o f anger, but individuals were angrier when
they received inconsistent rather than severe punishments. Consistency also had an effect
on the level o f aggression and retaliatory behavior the individual enacted. Individuals
who received inconsistent punishments were more likely to act aggressively against a
competitor and against a subordinate than were individuals receiving consistent
punishments. The implication of this study was that the level of punishment and the
procedures with which it is administered has differing effects on the individual.
Specifically, higher levels o f punishment are needed to change behavior, and fair
procedures are needed to reduce anger and retaliatory behaviors.
The impact o f the previous three articles has not been simply the finding that
consistency is important when administering punishments. The most important finding
o f these studies has been that people use procedures to determine the fairness of severe
punishment. Additionally, fair procedures appear to be a necessity in order to reduce the
negative side effects that accompany negative punishments. Also, a solid conclusion
could be made based on these studies that punishments always should be applied
consistently. Unfortunately, punishments cannot always be administered consistently
because o f the dynamics o f organizational settings; not all situations are exactly the same,
so other aspects o f punishment procedures also must be examined to find out if they have
similar effects on individuals’ reactions to punishment.
Ball, Trevino, Sims (1993) developed a model of subordinates’ attitudes in

response to punishment incidents. The authors proposed that negative attitudinal
reactions that occur during punishment are a result of the perceptions of unfair
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punishment. Therefore, the model was developed to explore the variables that affect
subordinate attitudes to punishment. This model is important because it was the first
model to examine punishment events through an organizational justice framework. The
variables and connections proposed by this model are the starting point for future
research.
The model proposes that personality variables, justice variables, and attitudinal
outcomes are all connected. The model proposes that the personality variables, belief in a
just world, and negative affectivity have direct and indirect effects on employees’
attitudes. The perceived justice o f the punishment event mediates the effect of
personality variables. The procedural justice characteristics are perceptions of
subordinate control, counseling, positive demeanor, arbitrariness, privacy, and
explanations. The distributive justice characteristic was the harshness o f the punishment.
The model also shows that the distributive and procedural justice variables affect
different attitudinal outcomes. Procedural characteristics would be a better predictor of
attitudes about procedural fairness, trust in the supervisor, satisfaction with the
supervisor, and organizational commitment, while the distributive characteristic
harshness should be the best predictor o f distributive justice and intentions to leave. For
the most part, the connections between predicted variables were supported. The
implication o f this study was that there are variables beyond consistency that affect the
perceptions o f punishment fairness. Additionally, this study provides evidence that fair
punishments affect attitudinal outcomes like commitment, satisfaction and intentions to
leave the company. One limitation of this model has been the fact that it does not take
into consideration how fairness impacts the level o f behavioral change that occurs with
the punishment.
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Trevino and Weaver (1998) also believed that justice evaluations were extremely
important to individuals’ reactions to punishment. The authors proposed five procedures
that managers must follow in order for subordinates to perceive the punishment as fair.
First, the severity o f the punishment must match the severity of the behavior and make
the punishment consistent with what others received. Second, the manager must provide
subordinates with input into the punishment decision-making process. Third, the
manager should use the punishment for constructive counseling and avoid negative
emotional actions. Fourth, the manager should adequately explain the punishment in a
way that ties it to the misconduct. Fifth, the punishment should be administered based on
organizational rules. One o f the procedural variables that was proposed by both Ball et
al. (1993) and Trevino and Weaver (1998) was that explanations should accompany the
punishment. Causal accounts have been proposed to be positively related to procedural
justice evaluations o f the punishment incident and therefore to increase the individual’s
perceptions o f fairness (Ball, Trevino, & Sims, 1992). Butterfield et al. (1996) found that
managers do use explanations to try to manage the impressions o f punishment. Managers
usually make self-serving explanations that often take the form o f excuses, justifications,
or apologies (Schlenker & Wiengold, 1992). Unfortunately, no research has been
undertaken to examine which type o f account will be most effective at reducing the
negative reactions to punishment.
Implications for Punishment in Organizations
The preceding discussion o f punishment and organizational justice has
implications for how supervisors and managers administer punishment to their
subordinates. Punishment usually brings about negative side effects, such as anger,
avoidance, resentment and retaliation, in the punished individual. The negative side
effects that accompany punishment are very similar to the reactions of individuals who
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receive unfair reward allocations. Managers must be aware of ways to punish
undesirable behavior without inciting these negative reactions.
Studies of punishment and justice have shown that fair procedures can be used to
decrease the negative reactions to punishment. The most often examined procedural
variable has been consistency. Unfortunately, consistency cannot always be used by
managers to influence the perceptions of punishment because of the dynamics of each
punishment event. Therefore, the focus of this study will be on a variable that can be
used during all punishment events regardless of the situation: social accounts. Social
accounts have been extremely effective at reducing the negative reactions of individuals
receiving damaging outcomes. Since individuals receiving negative punishment react
similarly to individuals receiving negative reward allocation decisions, a social account
should have a similar effect on a punished individual’s reactions. Managers do use social
accounts to manage subordinates’ impressions of the punishment, but no one has
examined which of the four types of accounts is most effective at reducing subordinates’
reactions.
The research problem of this thesis is: how can managers effectively use
punishment to change undesirable behavior without the punished individual having
negative side effects that result in detrimental effects on the organization?
This study has a threefold focus. First, at what level of punishment severity will
undesirable behaviors be most effectively changed? Second, will social accounts
increase the perceived fairness and increase individual’s attitudes towards the levels of
punishment? Finally, will ideological accounts and causal accounts differ in their
patterns o f effectiveness for the different levels of punishment?
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Chapter 5
Research Design and Hypotheses
The present study uses a 3 x 3 design. The first independent variable manipulated
the severity o f the punishment with three levels: low, medium, high; and the second
independent variable manipulated the type of account that was given: ideological, causal,
redundant account.
The majority o f studies in the punishment literature have examined the most
effective methods o f changing behavior with punishment, while most of the literature
joining justice and punishment have not included the effectiveness o f behavioral change
in their examination o f perceived punishment fairness (Bennett, 1998, as the sole
exception). Therefore, in concordance with the punishment literature, the first two
hypotheses state the predicted conditions under which there will be the most behavioral
change.
Hypothesis 1: The high level o f punishment will result in greater performance
compared to either low or moderate punishment.
Hypothesis 2: The punishment severity and social account type will interact to
affect performance. Specifically, at the low level of punishment the presence o f a social
account will have no effect on performance, but at moderate and high levels of
punishment the presence o f an account will result in greater performance in comparison
to a redundant account.
Bennett (1998) found that high levels of punishment decreased perceptions of
fairness and increased negative attitudes (anger, dissatisfaction, retaliation). Hypothesis
3 provides the same prediction for the current study.
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Hypothesis 3: There will be a main effect o f punishment on punishment fairness,
Interactional Justice, anger, retaliatory behavior, and dissatisfaction. Specifically, the
high level o f punishment will decrease the perceptions o f punishment fairness and
Interactional Justice and increase levels of anger, retaliatory behavior, and dissatisfaction
compared to low or moderate punishment. Additionally, a moderate level of punishment
will decrease the perceptions o f punishment fairness and Interactional Justice and
increase levels o f anger, retaliatory behavior, and dissatisfaction compared to low
punishment.
The benefits o f social accounts on perceived fairness and reactions to negative
outcomes have been found in many organizational settings, and there appears to be some
benefit for them in punishment incidents. Ball et al. (1993) found that social accounts are
effective at increasing perceptions o f fairness during punishment, but to date, no study
has experimentally examined the effects of social accounts in a punishment context.
Hypothesis 4: There will be a main effect of social account on punishment
fairness, Interactional Justice, anger, retaliatory behavior, and dissatisfaction. Individuals
receiving an account will have increased perceptions o f punishment fairness and
Interactional Justice and will show less anger, retaliatory behaviors, and dissatisfaction
compared to individuals receiving a redundant account.
The group-value model states that procedures are important to individuals’
perceptions o f fairness because they convey to the individual his/her status within the
group. Therefore, fair procedures convey to the individual dignity and respect.
Ideological accounts, in which the decision-maker takes responsibility, justifies the
outcome, and appeals to a superordinate goal, should be perceived as fairer than causal
accounts, in which the decision-maker does not take responsibility and blames the
punishment on mitigating circumstances. The causal account should be seen as a less
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viable explanation for the punishment and, therefore, will be judged as less fair than the
ideological account.
Outcome severity has been shown to moderate the effect of social accounts on
fairness and attitudes. The level o f the punishment severity should have an effect on
perceptions of fairness, attitudes, and behaviors. Schlenker (1980) found the severity of
the injustice was affected by the extent to which the behavior appeared to contradict an
aspect of the individual’s social-identity. An ideological account takes into consideration
the individual’s self-identity by explaining the reasons for the negative outcomes through
the use of a superordinate goal and appeals to the individual’s values. The decision
maker shows the individual dignity and respect by taking complete responsibility for and
justifying the reasons for the negative outcomes the individual received. Since the
ideological account helps to make sure that punishment does not contradict the
individual’s self-identity, ideological accounts should help increase perceptions of
fairness for all levels o f punishment. Therefore, even high levels o f punishment should
be perceived as appropriate when ideological accounts are given. Individuals receiving
an ideological account should perceive a high level o f punishment fairer than an
individual receiving a causal account or no account.
Causal accounts will have the greatest effect when the punishment’s severity is
moderately strong. When the punishment is very weak, the social account should not
have an effect because the mild nature of the punishment should not harm the individual
to the point where an explanation is needed. Additionally, when the punishment is
extremely severe, more than simply a causal account will be needed to change how the
individual feels about the punishment event. Therefore, at a moderate level of
punishment the individual should be most receptive to the causal account, and as a result,
the causal account should be most effective at increasing perceptions o f fairness and
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decreasing negative attitudes at moderate levels of punishment. Ideological and causal
accounts will have different patterns depicting their moderating effects.
Hypothesis 5: There will be an interaction of punishment severity and social
account. Specifically, at the high level o f punishment, individuals receiving an
ideological account will have greater perceptions of punishment fairness and Interactional
Justice and will have less anger, retaliatory behaviors, and dissatisfaction compared to
individuals receiving a causal account. Additionally, at the low level of punishment, no
differences are predicted between any o f the account conditions.
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Chapter 6
Method
Participants
One hundred-ninety-five Midwestern university students participated voluntarily
in the experiment. The sample consisted of 68% females and 32% males with gender
distribution by condition ranging from 45% female to 85% female. The average age of
the participants was 21 years old. Most of the participants were early in their college
careers (32% freshman, 34% sophomores, 19% juniors, 14% seniors, and less than 1%
classified themselves as either nondegree or graduates students). Seventy-three percent
o f the students were in majors outside of psychology. Participants were given extra
credit points for participating in the study along with 20 opportunities to win a $150 gift
certificate in a lottery.
Design
The experiment is a 3 x 3 between-subjects design. The independent variables
include the level o f punishment (low, moderate, and high) and the type of social account
(ideological, causal and redundant account). The dependent variables include
punishment fairness, Interactional Justice, satisfaction with the experimenter, anger, and
intention to retaliate.
Measures
Manipulation checks. Numerous items were used to assess the impact of the
independent variables and other experimental features. The impact o f the independent
variables was examined with two questions that assessed the punishment severity and two
questions that assessed the social accounts. Punishment severity was examined with
Questions 2 and 3 from Appendix C. The three bipolar items of Question 3 were
aggregated to form a scale. Question 2 along with Question 7 and Question 8 that
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examines the effectiveness of the accounts were measured on a 7-point rating scale (1strongly disagree to 7-strongly agree).
Other measures assessed the impact of certain experimental features such as the
gift certificate value, the number o f tickets participants received, and the understanding of
the social accounts. (See Appendix B and C for the additional manipulation check
items).
Attitudinal scales. Questionnaire B contained scales for fairness of punishment,
Interactional Justice, satisfaction with the experimenter, and anger. Each item was rated
on a 7-point scale. The punishment fairness scales contained five bipolar items that were
aggregated to form a scale. The measure was adapted from Ball et al. (1993) (alpha =
.96). Four items measured Interactional Justice (items 9-13 in Appendix C). Three items
measured satisfaction with the experiment (items 14-16 in Appendix C). Finally, four
bipolar items measured the amount of anger the participants felt about the removal of
tickets. These items were adapted from Bies et al (1988) (alpha = .92). The complete
questionnaire is located in Appendix C.
Questionnaire C contained questions about participants’ intentions to retaliate
against the experimenter. Participants were asked to evaluate the experiment for the
Psychology Department. The Psychology Department evaluation questionnaire was
developed to measure the retaliatory behavior the participants might show towards the
experimenter for the punishment they received. The complete questionnaire is located in
Appendix E.
Procedure
The experiment was run with 65 participants as an early pilot study to determine
the effectiveness of the independent variables. Small changes were made to the
independent variables to maximize their impact. First, it was determined that the no
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account condition had the same impact as the ideological and causal account conditions.
Post-experiment interviews determined that participants used the instructions at the
beginning o f the experiment as their explanation for why they had tickets taken away,
thus, their attitudes towards the punishment were at the same level as the individuals in
the social account conditions. Two steps were taken to combat this problem. First, the
opening instructions were made more general. Second, the participants in the no account
condition received an explanation that was general and based on the instructions. By
making the instructions more general, participants had less information to process the
reasons for the punishment. The no account condition was now labeled the redundant
account condition.
The appropriate number o f tickets taken away for the three levels o f punishment
severity was also determined during the initial stage o f the experiment. It was important
to find the number o f tickets that would be perceived to be slightly, moderately and
highly punishing. It was determined that 1 worked best for low, 5 for moderate, and 9 for
high.
When the participants arrived at the laboratory, they were greeted and were seated
around a large table. Groups o f three to six participants participated in the experiment at
the same time. First, the participants were invited to read and sign the consent form in
Appendix G. Next, the experimental instructions were read out loud to the participants.
The participants were told that they would complete two simple editing tasks. For each
o f the editing tasks, the participants were required to circle the entire set o f upper case
and lower case letter Ts that appeared in a story. The reward for circling 90% of the Ts
that appear in each task would be 10 tickets for a lottery drawing for a $150 gift
certificate that would occur at the end of the data collection. If the participant did not
identify 90% o f the Ts on each task, some o f their tickets would be taken away from the
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total number o f tickets they received.
Participants were taken to isolated rooms where they found 10 lottery tickets
placed on the desk with the first task. Task 1 was timed for 10 minutes, at which time the
experimenter collected the task from each participant and pretended to grade it while the
participants completed Questionnaire A. After approximately 10 minutes the
experimenter returned to participants a sheet of paper explaining the level o f punishment
they received (the number o f tickets removed) and an account explaining the reason for
the level of punishment they received. Participants reviewed their score sheet and
completed Questionnaire B.
The participants next completed Task 2. Before beginning the task, the
experimenter reminded the participants that they still had an opportunity to obtain an
additional 10 tickets if they could perform well on the next task. After 10 minutes, the
experimenter gathered the task and pretended to grade it while the participants completed
the retaliation questionnaire.
After the participants completed all of the questionnaires, they were all brought
back together into the large room and debriefed. All of the participants were given 20
lottery tickets regardless of the punishment severity condition they were in along with
their extra credit. After the collection of the experimental data, the $150 gift certificate
was given to one research participant, and the remaining participants were notified that
the prize was awarded.
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Chapter 7
Results
This study examines how punishment levels and different types o f social accounts
affect people’s task performance and their attitudes. The performance-related dependent

variable was measured by counting the number of upper- and lower-case Ts that were
present in a short passage used on Task 1 and Task 2. The attitudinal dependent variables
were the fairness o f the punishment, the Interactional Justice, the punishment-induced
anger, the satisfaction with the experiment, and the intention to retaliate against the
experimenter.
The experimental results will be discussed below. The discussion will begin with
a review o f the analysis o f the manipulation checks. Next, the experimental analyses and
evaluation o f the hypotheses pertaining to the performance dependent variable will be
discussed. Then, the experimental analyses and evaluation o f the hypotheses pertaining
to the attitudinal dependent variables will be examined. Finally, the results section will
conclude with an exploratory analysis of the no account and redundant account
conditions.
Manipulation Checks
Manipulation checks were used in this study to determine whether or not
participants understood important aspects o f the experiment, especially the experimental
treatments. A two-way analysis o f variance (ANOVA) was use to analyze the
punishment severity and adequacy o f the social accounts. Other manipulation checks
were analyzed in order to evaluate participants’ understanding of the experimental
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features. The other features included: (a) the gift certificate value; (b) the number of
tickets they received; (c) the participants’ understanding o f the social account.
Additional analyses were conducted to examine the Task 1 difficulty, and the analyses
included: (a) the number o f participants completing Task 1 and (b) and the number of
individuals achieving 90% or more on Task 1. The results o f the manipulation check
analyses are discussed in the following sections.
Punishment severity. Either one, five or nine tickets from the participants’
original ten tickets were removed for not performing satisfactorily on Task 1. This
removal o f tickets manipulated the three levels of punishment severity. Participants who
had more tickets removed from their original allotment of ten tickets, as a result of poor
performance, should have perceived the ticket removal as more severe than participants
who had fewer tickets removed.
The punishment severity was measured with two questions, Question 2 and
Question 3, on Questionnaire B. Question 2 asked participants, “How much o f a penalty
did you feel ticket removal was?” A two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was
performed using Question 2 as the dependent variable and punishment severity (low,
moderate, and high) and social account type (ideological, causal, and redundant) as the
independent variables. Table 1 displays the means of the experimental conditions, and
Table 2 displays the ANOVA table for this analysis.
As expected, there was a significant main effect o f punishment level.
Unexpectedly, a significant main effect of social account type was revealed. Finally, a
significant interaction between punishment level and social account type was found.
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Table 1
Punishment Severity Manipulation Check Means (02)

Punishment Level
Account
Type

Low

Moderate

High

Means

Ideological

1.45

3.60

4.95

3.33

Causal

1.30

3.20

4.70

3.07

Redundant

1.20

3.95

6.00

3.72

Means

1.32

3.58

5.22

3.37

Note. Scale is 1 to 7 where higher values indicate greater severity. Condition n = 20.
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Table 2
ANOVA o f the Punishment Severity Manipulation Check ( 0 2 )

Source

Punishment Level (P)

SS

df

F

E

n2

460.31

2

185.25

.001

.684

Account Type (A)

12.81

2

5.16

.007

.057

Px A

12.49

4

2.51

.043

.056

Error

212.45

171
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Since the significant interaction takes precedence over the significant main effects, the
interaction will be discussed in detail.
Simple effect analyses were performed to reveal the pattern o f the interaction.
Four significant simple effects were found. A significant simple main effect of
punishment was found for each o f the three social account conditions at p<.001. A
Tukey Honestly Significant Difference Test was used to further evaluate all significant
simple main effects, and the alpha level was set at .05. The pattern o f these simple main
effects indicates that the low severity level was perceived to be less severe than the
moderate or high punishment levels, and the moderate severity condition was perceived
« to be less severe than the high punishment for each o f the social account conditions. The
pattern o f means for these conditions can be found in Table 1. Finally, an unexpected
simple effect o f account type was found at the high punishment level, F(2,169)=7.57,
p<.01. A post hoc analysis revealed that the redundant account (M=6.00) increased
participants’ perceptions of punishment severity compared to the causal account
(M=4.70) or the ideological account (M=4.95); the causal and ideological accounts did
not differentially affect participants’ perceptions of punishment severity.
The results indicated that as the punishment level increased, participants’
perceptions o f punishment severity increased for all account types. For the low or
moderate punishment level, the account type did not influence participants’ perceptions
o f punishment severity, but at the high punishment level, providing an ideological or a
causal account helped ease the negative effects o f the high punishment compared to
providing a redundant account.
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Question 3 on Questionnaire B asked participants to circle a value on three
bipolar scales that illustrated their feelings about the penalty they received. The bipolar
responses were aggregated into a scale and used in this analysis. A two-way analysis of
variance was performed using Question 3 as the dependent variable and punishment
severity and account types as the independent variables. Table 3 displays the means for
the experimental conditions, and Table 4 displays the ANOVA table o f the results.
As expected, there was a significant main effect o f punishment level. A Tukey
Honestly Significant Difference Test was used for all post hoc analyses, and the alpha
level was set at .05. A post hoc analysis indicated that the punishment level participants
received directly influenced their severity perceptions. Specifically, participants who
received a low severity level (M -2.19) perceived the punishment to be less severe than
participants receiving a moderate (M=3.63) or high punishment level (M=4.93), and
participants receiving a moderate punishment perceived the punishment to be less severe
than participants receiving a high punishment level. The results indicated that
participants’ perceptions o f punishment severity increased as the punishment level
increased.
Questions 2 and 3 in Questionnaire B were used to evaluate participants’
perceptions of punishment severity. As expected, there was a significant correlation
between the two questions, r=.81, p<.001 suggesting that the two questions were
measuring a similar construct and presumably the construct was punishment severity
perceptions. The analysis o f the two punishment severity manipulation checks questions
revealed that punishment level affected how participants perceived the punishment’s

Table 3
Punishment Severity Manipulation Check Means (03)

Punishment Levei
Account
Type

Low

Moderate

High

Means

Ideological

2.48

3.63

4.47

3.51

Causal

2.00

3.38

4.86

3.39

Redundant

2.08

3.87

5.42

3.79

Means

2.19

3.63

4.93

3.57

Note. Scale is 1 to 7 where higher values indicate greater severity. Condition n = 20,
except the ideological high and causal high conditions, n = 19. Two participants were not
included because o f incomplete survey data.
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Table 4
ANOVA o f the Punishment Severity Manipulation Check (03)

Source

Punishment Level (P)

SS

df

F

E

*1

.001

.515

219.76

2

89.72

Account Type (A)

4.38

2

2.19

ns

—

Px A

9.41

4

2.35

ns

—

Error

206.99

169
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severity. Specifically, at the low punishment level, participants felt as though the
punishment were mildly severe; at the moderate punishment level, participants felt as
though the punishment were moderately severe; and at the high punishment level, the
participants felt as though the punishment were strongly severe.
In summary, the expected main effect of punishment severity was found across
the three social account types for both Question 2 and Question 3. As the punishment
severity increased, participants’ perceptions of punishment severity also increased. One
minor qualification to this main effect pattern occurred for Question 2. The analysis of
the significant interaction revealed that in addition to the three significant severity simple
effects, there was also one significant account simple effect. At the high punishment
level, providing an ideological and causal account reduced participants’ perceptions of
punishment severity more than providing a redundant account.
Account adequacy. The adequacy o f the three social accounts was evaluated with
two questions, Question 7 and Question 8, from Questionnaire B. Question 7 asked the
participants, “How adequate was the explanation provided on the Task 1 score sheet that
describes why you had tickets taken away?” The intent of this question was to determine
if the participants felt that the explanation they received provided strong enough
justification as to why they had the number o f tickets taken away that they did. It was
predicted that participants who received an ideological account or a causal account would
perceive the account to be more adequate than participants receiving a redundant account
because an ideological and a causal account are more detailed and provide the
participants with a plausible reason why they had tickets taken away.
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A two-way analysis o f variance was performed using punishment level and
account type as the independent variables and Question 7 as the dependent variable.
Table 5 displays the means for the experimental conditions, and Table 6 displays the
ANOVA table for this analysis.
As expected, there was a significant main effect of account type. A Tukey
Honestly Significant Difference Test was used for all post hoc analyses, and the alpha
level was set at .05. A post hoc analysis indicated that participants perceived the
ideological account (M=4.58) and causal account (M=4.20) to be significantly more
adequate than the redundant account (M=3.19). There was no significant difference
between the ideological and causal accounts. Unexpectedly, there was also a significant
main effect o f punishment level. The follow-up post hoc analysis indicates that
participants receiving a low punishment level (M=4.83) perceived the account they
received to be more adequate than participants receiving a moderate (M=3.68) or high
punishment level (M=3.48). There was no significant difference between the moderate or
high punishment levels. The interaction of punishment level and account type was not
significant.
These results indicate that the ideological and causal accounts were effective.
Both the ideological and causal accounts were perceived to be significantly more
adequate than the redundant account. The unexpected significant main effect of
punishment severity suggested that each account type was perceived to be more adequate
when they received a weak punishment compared to when they received a moderate or
high punishment.
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Table 5
Social Account Manipulation Check Means (07)

Punishment Level
Account
Type

Low

Moderate

High

Means

Ideological

5.80

3.65

4.30

4.58

Causal

4.53

4.15

3.95

4.20

Redundant

4.15

3.21

2.20

3.19

Means

4.83

3.68

3.48

3.99

Note. Scale is 1 to 7 where higher values indicate greater adequacy. Condition n = 20,
except the causal low and redundant moderate conditions, n = 19. Two participants were
not included because o f incomplete survey data.
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Table 6
ANOVA o f the Social Account Manipulation Check ( 0 7 )

Source

df

F

E

Punishment Level (P)

62.59

2

8.60

.001

.092

Account Type (A)

61.97

2

8.51

.001

.092

Px A

26.29

4

1.81

ns

—

Error

615.10

169
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Question 8 asked the participants, “How sufficient was the explanation provided
on the Task 1 score sheet that describes why you had tickets taken away?” The intent of
this question was to determine if the participants felt that the explanation they received
provided enough information as to why they had the number o f tickets taken away that
they did. It was predicted that the ideological account and the causal account would be
perceived to be more sufficient than the redundant account since these two accounts are
more detailed and provide the participants with a significant amount o f information why
they had tickets taken away.
A two-way analysis o f variance was performed using Question 8 as the dependent
variable and punishment level and account type as the independent variables. Table 7
displays the means for the experimental conditions, and Table 8 displays the ANOVA
table for this analysis.
As predicted, there was a significant main effect o f account type. A Tukey
Honestly Significant Difference Test was used for all post hoc analyses, and the alpha
level was set at .05. The follow-up post hoc analysis showed that participants perceived
the ideological account (M=4.63) and causal account (M=4.30) to be significantly more
sufficient than the redundant account (M=2.95). There was no significant difference
between the ideological and causal accounts. Unexpectedly, there was also a significant
main effect o f punishment level. A post hoc analysis indicates that participants receiving
a low punishment level (M=4.62) perceived the account they received to be more
sufficient than participants receiving a moderate (M=3.77) or high punishment level
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Table 7
Social Account Manipulation Check Means f08)

Punishment Level
Account
Type

Low

Moderate

High

Means

Ideological

5.75

4.20

3.95

4.63

Causal

4.45

4.30

4.15

4.30

Redundant

3.65

2.80

2.40

2.95

Means

4.62

3.77

3.50

3.96

Note. Scale is 1 to 7 where higher values indicate greater sufficiency. Condition n = 20.
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Table 8
ANOVA o f the Social Account Manipulation Check (08)

Source

SS

df

F

E

Tl2

Punishment Level (P)

40.81

2

5.63

.004

.062

Account Type (A)

95.34

2

13.15

.001

.133

Px A

14.42

4

.99

ns

—

Error

620.15

171
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(M=3.50). There was no significant difference between the moderate or high punishment
levels. Additionally, the interaction o f punishment level and account type was not
significant. Both the ideological and causal accounts were perceived to be significantly
more sufficient than the redundant account. Finally, since there was no significant
difference between the ideological and causal accounts, the results indicated that
participants felt as though these two accounts provided a similar level o f detail in the
explanations. The unexpected significant main effect of punishment severity revealed
that the perceived sufficiency o f the explanation was significantly higher when the
punishment was weak compared to when it was moderate or high The account
sufficiency o f all three accounts decreased as the punishment became more severe.
Questions 7 and 8 on Questionnaire B were used to measure how effectively each
social account was in explaining why the participants had their specific number of tickets
taken away. The results indicated that participants perceived the ideological and causal
accounts both to be more adequate and more sufficient than the redundant account. The
unanticipated main effect o f punishment severity for adequacy and sufficiency indicated
that the punishment level affected participants’ perceptions of the social account, such
that a weak punishment resulted in significantly more adequate accounts than did a
moderate or high punishment. Since Question 7 and Question 8 were used to evaluate the
effectiveness o f the social accounts in explaining why the participant had tickets taken
away, it was predicted that the two items would be highly correlated. Question 7 and
Question 8 were significantly correlated, r=76, p<.001. Participants who perceived the
social account as adequate also perceived the social account to be sufficient.
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Overall, the analyses for Question 7 and Question 8 produced the same pattern of
results. Ultimately, the results indicate that ideological and causal accounts provided the
participants a better justification for why they received the punishment. Despite the fact
that ideological and causal accounts were perceived to be more adequate and sufficient
than the redundant account, the overall results indicate that the mean adequacy and
sufficiency ratings for the ideological and causal accounts were smaller than expected.
The small mean ratings o f adequacy and sufficiency could have resulted from poorly
designed social accounts.
Other manipulation checks. Other manipulation check questions were asked in
Questionnaire A and Questionnaire B. These manipulation checks were intended to
examine participants’ understanding o f the information provided in the experiment.
Additional manipulations checks were conducted to evaluate participants’ performance
on Task 1.
Question 5 on Questionnaire A asked the participants, “What was the value o f the
gift certificate you could receive?” The intent o f this question was to determine if the
participants knew the value o f the gift certificate that was being given away as a prize by
the experimenter. Since the amount o f the gift certificate could potentially impact the
participants’ perceptions o f the punishment severity, it is important to know if the
participants were aware o f the gift certificate amount. Incorrect answers could indicate
that participants did not pay close attention to the experimenter’s instructions. Ninetyeight percent o f the participants (177 out o f 180) were aware o f the gift certificate
amount.
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Question 1 on Questionnaire B asked the participants to identify the number of
tickets they received for completing Task 1. The intent of this question was to determine
how conscientiously the participants read the Task 1 Score Sheet. An incorrect response
would indicate that the participant did not thoroughly read the Task 1 Score Sheet.
Ninety-nine percent of the participants (178 out o f 180) correctly identified the number of
tickets they received on Task 1.
Question 4 asked the participants, “Who was responsible for taking away the
tickets for Task 1?” Participants were to circle either the response choice “Experimenter”
or the response choice “Thesis Committee.” The intent of this item was to determine if
the participants in the ideological and causal account conditions understood who was
responsible for deciding how many tickets the participants would have taken away. In
the ideological account, participants were told that the experimenter had taken away
tickets to help motivate the participants to increase their performance on Task 2. In the
causal account, the participants were told that the experimenter’s thesis committee
determined the level o f punishment that they would receive and the experimenter was not
involved in the decision. Seventy percent of the participants (42 out of 60) receiving an
ideological account indicated that the experimenter was the individual who was
responsible for taking away Task 1 tickets. Ninety-five percent o f the participants (57
out o f 60) receiving a causal account indicated that the thesis committee was responsible
for taking away Task 1 tickets. These results indicate that the majority o f participants did
thoroughly read and understand who was responsible for taking away tickets in the
ideological and causal accounts.
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The final two manipulation checks evaluated participants’ performance on Task 1.
In this experiment, one o f the goals was to examine how punishment level and account
type would affect participants’ performance from Task 1 to Task 2. One of the greatest
challenges o f this study was to determine the appropriate length of Task 1. Task 1
needed to be long enough that participants would fall just short o f finishing but not be so
long that the participants would not come close to finishing. If Task 1 were too short and
many o f the participants completed the task within the allotted 10 minutes, a ceiling
would be placed on participants’ performance resulting in an unrepresentative measure of
Task 1 performance. If the task was too long, and the participants only finished a small
portion o f the task, they would not feel unfairly treated when tickets were taken away
because internally they knew they deserved the outcome.
The first evaluation of the participants’ performance on Task 1 was the number of
participants who finished the task. Twenty-seven of the 180 (15%) participants finished
Task 1. Finishing Task 1 was defined as any participant who circled the last “t”. This
measure was an indication of a potential ceiling effect because participants who finished
the task could only increase their performance by going back through the task and finding
any “ts” they missed. Therefore, completing Task 1 was not a measure of the number of
“ts” circled in Task 1. These 27 participants may or may not have performed well on
Task 1.
The second evaluation of participants’ performance on Task 1, the number of “ts”
circled, was performed to determine the number of participants who performed extremely
well on the task. Excellent performance was defined as participants who circled 90% or
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more o f the “ts” in Task 1. Ninety percent was used as the standard o f excellence
because that was the value participants in the ideological and causal accounts were told
they needed to achieve. Twenty out of the 180 (11%) o f the participants were able to
circle 90% or more of the “ts” in Task 1. The pattern o f results from participants’ Task 1
performance indicated that relatively few participants were able to complete Task 1 and
even fewer were able to circle 90% or more of the “ts”. Theses results indicate that there
was not a ceiling on participants’ Task 1 performance.
In summary, the manipulations appeared to work as intended, and participants
seemed to understand the experimental information given to them throughout the
experiment. The analysis o f the punishment severity confirmed that participants
receiving higher punishment levels perceived the punishment as more severe. The
analysis o f the social account adequacy confirmed that participants in the ideological and
causal accounts perceived the explanation for ticket removal as more adequate and more
sufficient than participants in the redundant account. Additionally, participants were
aware o f both the number o f tickets they had taken away from them and the value of gift
certificate. The causal account results indicate that participants understood that the
experimenter’s thesis committee was responsible for removing the participant’s tickets.
The ideological account results indicate that participants understood that the experimenter
was responsible for removing the participant’s tickets. Finally, there did not appear to be
a ceiling on participants’ performance on Task 1 that might have resulted from too short a
task.
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Dependent Variables
This experiment proposed that the punishment level and social account type
would affect both the participants’ performance and the participants’ attitudes towards
the punishment and experiment. Performance was measured by counting the number of
upper- and lower-case “ts” correctly circled in Task 2 and controlling for the number of
“ts” circled in Task 1. The participants’ attitudes towards the punishment level and
social account type were measured with five dependent variables: fairness o f the
punishment, Interactional Justice, satisfaction with the experiment, anger produced as a
result o f the punishment, and intention to retaliate against the experimenter.
Performance measure. Performance was measured by counting the number of
upper- and lower-case “ts” correctly circled in Task 2 and controlling for the number of
correctly circled “ts” in Task 1. The intent of the performance measure was to evaluate
how the participants’ performance on Task 2 changed from Task 1 after they received the
independent variable manipulations. Therefore, evaluating Task 2 after controlling for
the performance on Task 1 would provide evidence as to the effect o f the independent
variables on Task 2 performance beyond the performance on Task 1.
A two-way analysis o f covariance (ANCOVA) was conducted to evaluate the
effects o f punishment level and social account type on participants’ performance on Task
2. Task 1 was appropriate to use as the covariate in the ANCOVA because it was
administered before the application o f the independent variable manipulations, and
because Task 1 and Task 2 are significantly correlated, r=. 71, p<.001. After the removal
o f one univariate outlier on Task 1, homogeneity of regression was achieved, F(8,
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178)=1.76, p=.09. The mean number of “ts” circled on Task 1 and Task 2 is displayed in
Table 9 and Table 10, respectively. The mean number of “ts” circled on Task 2 adjusted
for the covariate, Task 1, is displayed in Table 11. Finally, the ANCOVA table is located
in Table 12.
The ANCOVA analysis reveals that the main effect o f punishment level was not
significant. Interestingly, the main effect of account type was significant. Finally, the
interaction o f punishment level and account type was not significant. The results indicate
that Task 2 performance after controlling for Task 1 performance was not affected either
by the punishment level or by the interaction o f punishment level and social account type,
but that the account type received affected performance. Two hypotheses were proposed
to explain the effect of punishment level and social account type on the performance
dependent variable. The a priori contrasts used to evaluate the two hypotheses are
discussed below.
Hypothesis 1 predicted that the high punishment level would result in greater
performance compared to either low or moderate punishment. The contrast between the
high punishment condition and the moderate and low punishment conditions was not
significant, t(170) = 1.512, p>.10 . Specifically, participants receiving the high
punishment condition (M=347.98) did not perform better on Task 2 than did participants
receiving the moderate and low punishment conditions (M=349.78). As a result,
Hypothesis 1 is not supported.
Hypothesis 2 predicted that the punishment level and social account type would
interact to affect performance. Specifically, at the low punishment level the presence o f a
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Table 9
Mean Number o f “Ts” Circled on Task 1

Punishment Level
Account
Type

Low

Moderate

High

Means

Ideological

304.10

297.84

264.70

288.88

Causal

287.55

304.75

290.75

294.35

Redundant

305.60

291.00

304.95

300.52

Means

299.08

297.86

286.80

294.58

Note. Condition n = 20, except the ideological moderate condition n=19. One case was
removed because o f an outlier on Task 1.
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Table 10
Mean Number o f “Ts” Circled on Task 2

Punishment Level
Account
Type

Low

Moderate

High

Means

Ideological

353.65

362.37

333.30

349.74

Causal

351.75

363.25

342.30

352.43

Redundant

341.10

337.30

349.05

342.48

Means

348.83

354.31

341.55

348.23

Note. Condition n = 20, except the ideological moderate condition, n=19. One case was
removed because o f an outlier on Task 1.
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Table 11
Adjusted Mean Number o f “Ts” Circled on Task 2

Punishment Level
Account
Type

Low

Moderate

High

Means

Ideological

345.75

359.65

358.03

354.48

Causal

357.56

354.81

345.46

352.61

Redundant

331.96

340.25

340.45

337.55

Means

345.09

351.57

347.98

348.22

Note. Condition n = 20, except the ideological moderate condition, n=19. One case was
removed because o f an outlier on Task 1.
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Table 12
ANCOVA o f the Performance on Task 2

Source

SS

df

F

p

.001

.562

ns

—

.026

.042

ns

—

290534.37

1

216.73

Punishment Level (P)

704.40

2

.46

Account Type (A)

9009.61

2

3.72

Px A

26.29

4

.65

Error

232055.18

170

Task 1 Performance
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social account would have no effect on performance, but at moderate and high levels of
punishment the presence o f an account would result in greater performance in
comparison to a redundant account. At the low punishment level, the contrast between
the average o f the ideological and causal account and the redundant account was not
significant, t(170) = 1.01, p>.10. Participants who received an ideological or causal
account (M=351.66) did not perform better on Task 2 than participants receiving a
redundant account (M=331.96) in the low punishment condition. At the moderate
punishment level, the contrast between the average o f the ideological and causal account
and the redundant account was significant, t(170) = 2.22, p=.03. Participants who
received an ideological or causal account (M=357.16) did perform better on Task 2 than
participants receiving a redundant account (M=340.50) in the moderate punishment
condition. At the high punishment level, the contrast between the ideological and causal
account and the redundant account was not significant, t(170) = 1.00, p>.10. Participants
who received an ideological or causal account (M=351.75) did not perform better on
Task 2 than participants receiving a redundant account (M=340.45) in the high
punishment condition. Hypothesis 2 was partially supported.
Attitudinal Measures
Scale formation. Participants completed two questionnaires that contained the
dependent variable scales. Questionnaire B contained the measures o f fairness o f the
punishment, Interactional Justice, satisfaction with the experiment, and anger due to the
punishment. The Psychology Department Survey contained the intention to retaliate
measure.
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An analysis of internal consistency was performed on each variable’s items before
developing the dependent variable scales. The internal reliability for each dependent
variable’s items was evaluated by Cronbach’s Alpha, and the reliabilities were presented
in Table 13. All o f the dependent variable scales except the satisfaction scale possessed
the reliability o f at least .70 that Nunnally (1994) suggested to be an adequate internal
consistency for evaluating group data. After the removal o f item 15 from Questionnaire
B, the reliability o f the satisfaction scale increased to near the .70 level. Following the
internal consistency analysis, the items comprising each scale were aggregated to form a
composite scale measuring each dependent variable. The composite scores were used in
all subsequent analyses.
Attitudinal analyses. The analysis o f the attitudinal dependent variables will
begin with a discussion o f the results of the multivariate analysis of variance and each
dependent variable’s univariate analysis of variance. The attitudinal analysis section will
conclude with a review o f the remaining experimental hypotheses and a review o f their
specific a priori contrasts.
The omnibus F tests for the multivariate and univariate analysis o f variance were
provided to illustrate the overall effect of the two independent variables on the five
attitudinal dependent variables. No follow-up post hoc analyses were performed to
evaluate significant main effects or interactions. Instead, the anticipated effects of
punishment level and social account level, predicted in Hypotheses 3, 4, and 5, were
examined with a priori contrasts and will be discussed after the presentation o f the
omnibus F tests.
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Table 13
Intercorrelations and Cronbach’s Alpha for Attitudinal Scales

Scale

1

2

1. Fairness

.93

2. Interactional Justice

-.26

.88

3. Satisfaction

-.41

.73

.69

4. Anger

-.75

.31

.44

.91

5. Retaliation

-.26

.35

.39

.39

3

Note. All correlation coefficients are significant, p<.01
Cronbach’s Alpha for each scale is shown on the diagonal.

4

5

.78
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A two-way multivariate analysis o f variance (MANOVA) was performed using
the five attitudinal variables (fairness of punishment, Interactional Fairness, satisfaction
with the experiment, anger due to the punishment, and intention to retaliate) as the
dependent variables and the punishment level and social account type as the independent
variables. The MANOVA table is displayed in Table 14.
The main effect o f punishment level was significant. The main effect of account
type was not significant, but as Table 14 shows, was nearly significant (p=.057). Finally,
the interaction o f punishment level and account type was not significant. The results
reveal that across the five dependent variables, the punishment level has a significant
effect on participants’ attitudes towards the punishment, the experimenter, and the
experiment.
Five two-way analyses o f variance (ANOVA) were performed using punishment
fairness, Interactional Justice, satisfaction, anger, and retaliation as the dependent
variables, and the punishment level and social account type as the independent variables
for the five dependent variables. Condition means are displayed in Tables 15, 17, 19, 21,
23, respectively, and their ANOVA summaries table in Tables 16, 18, 20, 22, 24,
respectively.
A significant main effect o f punishment was found for the punishment fairness,
satisfaction with the experiment, anger, and retaliation toward the experimenter, and there
was a nearly significant main effect for Interactional Justice (Table 18). A significant
main effect o f social account type was found for Interactional Justice and satisfaction
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Table 14
MANOVA o f the Five Attitudinal Variables

Source

1

F

E

*1

Punishment Level (P)

10

18.84

.001

.360

Account Type (A)

10

1.82

.057

—

PxA

20

.64

ns

—

Error

334
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Table 15
Punishment Fairness Scale Means

Punishment Level
Account
Type

Low

Moderate

High

Means

Ideological

1.37

3.01

4.13

2.84

Causal

1.87

3.25

4.36

3.16

Redundant

1.22

3.16

4.61

3.00

Means

1.49

3.14

4.37

2.99

Note. Scale is 1 to 7 where 1 is Fair and 7 is Unfair. Condition n = 20.
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Table 16
ANOVA of the Punishment Fairness Scale

Source

SS

F

E

2
11

.001

.528

250.65

2

95.51

Account Type (A)

3.14

2

1.20

ns

—

Px A

4.39

4

.84

ns

—

Error

224.38

171

Punishment Level (P)
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Table 17
Interactional Justice Scale Means

Punishment Level
Account
Type

Low

Moderate

High

Means

Ideological

6.88

6.46

6.22

6.45

Causal

6.43

5.94

6.10

6.16

Redundant

6.00

5.73

5.35

5.70

Means

6.38

6.04

5.89

6.10

Note. Scale is 1 to 7 where higher values indicate greater perceptions o f Interactional
Justice. Condition n = 20.
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Table 18
ANOVA o f the Interactional Justice Scale

Source

SS

Punishment Level (P)

7.43

F

2

2

2.89

.058

—

17.28

2

6.73

.002

.073

Px A

1.70

4

.43

ns

—

Error

219.71

171

Account Type (A)

df

'H2

84

Table 19
Satisfaction Scale Means

Punishment Level
Account
Type

Low

Moderate

High

Means

Ideological

6.78

6.65

6.10

6.51

Causal

6.48

6.32

6.18

6.33

Redundant

6.33

5.95

5.35

5.88

Means

6.53

6.31

5.88

6.24

Note. Scale is 1 to 7 where higher values indicate greater satisfaction. Condition n = 20,
except the causal moderate condition, n=19. One participant was not included because of
incomplete survey data.
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Table 20
ANOVA of the Satisfaction Scale

Source

SS

E

E

■n

Punishment Level (P)

13.14

2

5.94

.003

.065

Account Type (A)

12.74

2

5.75

.004

.063

Px A

2.59

4

.58

ns

—

Error

189.24

170

df
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Table 21
Anger Scale Means

Punishment Level
Account
Type

Low

Moderate

High

Means

Ideological

6.44

4.94

4.10

5.16

Causal

6.21

4.83

4.28

5.10

Redundant

6.43

4.45

3.64

4.84

Means

6.36

4.74

4.00

5.03

Note. Scale is 1 to 7 where higher values indicate less anger. Condition n = 20.

87

Table 22
ANOVA o f the Anger Scale

Source

Punishment Level (P)

SS

df

2

E

E

.001

.448

174.14

2

69.35

Account Type (A)

3.54

2

1.41

ns

—

Px A

4.05

4

.81

ns

—

Error

214.70

171
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Table 23
Retaliation Scale Means

Punishment Level
Account
Type

Low

Moderate

High

Means

Ideological

4.62

4.55

4.23

4.47

Causal

4.58

4.55

4.20

4.44

Redundant

4.65

4.20

4.23

4.36

Means

4.62

4.43

4.22

4.42

Note. Scale is 1 to 7 where higher values indicate less retaliation. Condition n = 20.
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Table 24
ANOVA o f the Retaliation Scale

Source

Punishment Level (P)

SS

df

F

E

o2

.001

.079

4.68

2

7.34

.37

2

.58

ns

—

Px A

1.32

4

1.04

ns

—

Error

54.48

171

Account Type (A)
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with the experiment. No significant punishment severity by social account type
interactions were found for any o f the attitudinal dependent variables.
Attitudinal hypotheses. Hypothesis 3 predicted that there would be a main effect
o f punishment on punishment fairness, Interactional Justice, anger, retaliatory behavior,
and dissatisfaction. Specifically, the high level o f punishment would decrease the
perceptions o f punishment fairness and Interactional Justice while increasing levels of
anger, retaliatory behavior, and dissatisfaction compared to low or moderate punishment.
Additionally, a moderate level o f punishment would decrease the perceptions of
punishment fairness and Interactional Justice while increasing levels of anger, retaliatory
behavior, and dissatisfaction compared to low punishment.
Two planned contrasts were used to evaluate Hypothesis 3. First, the high
punishment level was contrasted with the low and moderate punishment levels for each
attitudinal dependent variable. Second, the moderate punishment level was contrasted
with the low punishment level for each attitudinal dependent variable. Means for the five
dependent variables are displayed in Tables 15, 17, 19, 21, 23.
The first planned comparison was significant for punishment fairness
(t(171)=l 1.34, p<.001), satisfaction with the experiment (t(170)=3.32, p<.001), anger
(t(171)=8.71, p<.001), and intention to retaliate (t(171)=3.39, p<.001) but was not
significant for Interactional Justice (t(171)=1.79, p=.076). The second planned
comparison was significant for punishment fairness (t(171)=7.91, p<.001), satisfaction
with the experiment (t(170)=2.20, p=.03), and anger (t(171)=7.92, p<.001) but not
significant for either Interactional Justice (t(171)=1.61, p>.10) or intention to retaliate
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(t(l 71)=1.78, £=.077). Hypothesis 3 was fully supported for the dependent variables
fairness of punishment, satisfaction with the experiment, and anger about the punishment;
partially supported for the dependent variable intention to retaliate; and not supported for
interpersonal treatment. The results reveal that the high punishment level produced less
fairness, less satisfaction, greater anger, and greater intentions to retaliate than did either
the moderate or the low punishment levels. In addition, the moderate punishment level
produced less fairness, less satisfaction, and greater anger than did the low punishment
level. Finally, none of the three punishment levels significantly affected participants’
perceptions o f interpersonal treatment.
Hypothesis 4 predicted that there would be a main effect of social account on
punishment fairness, Interactional Justice, anger, retaliatory behavior, and dissatisfaction.
Individuals who received an account would have increased perceptions of punishment
fairness and Interactional Justice and would show less anger, retaliatory behaviors, and
dissatisfaction in comparison to individuals who received no social account. One
planned contrast was used to evaluate Hypothesis 4. Specifically, the ideological and
causal accounts were combined and contrasted with the redundant account for each
attitudinal dependent variable.
The planned comparison was significant for Interactional Justice (t(171)=3.38,
p<.001) and satisfaction with the experiment (t(171)=4.96, £<.001), but was not
significant for punishment fairness (t(171)=.01, p>.10), anger (t(171)=1.66, £>.10) or
intentions to retaliate (t(171)=1.06, £>.10). Thus, Hypothesis 4 was supported for two of
the five attitudinal dependent variables. Receiving a thorough explanation (ideological or
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causal accounts) for why the participant had lottery tickets taken away resulted in greater
perceptions o f interpersonal treatment and greater satisfaction than did receiving a
superficial explanation (a redundant account). However, the type o f account did not
affect participants’ perceptions o f punishment fairness, anger, or their intentions to
retaliate.
One important facet o f this study was examining how ideological and causal
accounts differentially impact peoples’ attitudes towards a negative outcome. Fair
procedures convey dignity and respect to the individual. It is expected that an
explanation that provides an individual dignity and respect in the face o f a negative
outcome will be the most effective at maintaining positive attitudes. A decision-maker
who provides an ideological account takes responsibility for the outcome, justifies the
outcome, and appeals to a superordinate goal. On the other hand, a decision-maker who
provides a causal account does not take responsibility for the outcome and blames the
negative outcome on mitigating circumstances. The ideological account, which focuses
the explanation on how the negative outcome can help the employee through a
superordinate goal, should be more effective at alleviating the negative impact o f harmful
outcome. Hypothesis 5 predicts a differential effect o f ideological and causal accounts at
the high severity level.
Three planned contrasts were used to evaluate Hypothesis 5. Specifically, the
first contrast examined the differential effect of the ideological and causal accounts for
each attitudinal dependent variable at the high punishment level. The other two contrasts
examined the differential effects of the social accounts at the low punishment level for
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each dependent variable. The second contrast specifically examined the average effect of
the ideological and causal accounts compared to the redundant account for each
attitudinal dependent variable at the low punishment level. The final contrast examined
the effect o f the ideological account to the causal account at the low punishment level for
each dependent variable.
The first contrast examines the prediction that at the high punishment level,
individuals who received an ideological account would perceive punishment as fairer,
would be more satisfied, would perceive the interpersonal treatment as more fair, would
be less angry, and would be less likely to retaliate. This contrast between the ideological
and causal accounts at the high punishment level was not significant for punishment
fairness (t(171)=.64, p>.10), Interactional Justice (t(171)=.74, p>.10), satisfaction with
the experiment (t(170)= 19, p>.10), anger (t(171)= 49, p>.10) or intention to retaliate
(t(171)= 19, p>.10). Means are displayed in Tables 15, 17, 19, 21, and 23. The
ideological account was unable to lessen the negative impact of the high punishment for
any o f the five attitudinal variables compared to the causal account.
The other two contrasts examine in tandem the null hypothesis that the three
social account types will have the same effect on the five attitudinal variables at the low
severity level. In other words, at the low punishment level, an account is not needed, and
a weak explanation will have the same effect as a thorough one.
This pair o f contrasts was evaluated for all five attitudinal variables. The first
planned contrast was significant for satisfaction with the experiment (t(170)=2.43, p= 02)
but was not significant for punishment fairness (t(l 71)=1.28, p>.10), Interactional Justice
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(t(171)=1.72, p=. 09), anger (t(171)=.33, p>.10), and intentions to retaliate, (t(171)= 32,
£>.10). The second planned contrast was not significant for any of the attitudinal
dependent variables; specifically, punishment fairness (t(l71)=1.38, p>.10), Interactional
Justice (t(171)= 70, p>.10), satisfaction with the experimenter (t(171)= 66, p>.10), anger
(t(171)=.64, p>.10), and intentions to retaliate (t(171)= 187, p>.10). Thus, the second
part o f Hypothesis 5 was supported for four of the five dependent variables. At the low
punishment level, the type o f account the participant received did not affect perceptions
o f punishment fairness, Interactional Justice, anger, or intentions to retaliate. In contrast
to Hypothesis 5, receiving an ideological or causal account increased perceptions of
satisfaction at the low punishment level.
In summary, Hypothesis 5 was partially supported for four o f the five dependent
variables. The results o f the first contrast revealed that at the high punishment level the
ideological account was not found to affect differentially any o f the five dependent
variables. This indicated that the two social accounts had equivalent impact on the five
dependent variables, and these results do not support Hypothesis 5. The other two
contrasts examined if any o f the account types would significantly affect the five
dependent variables at the low punishment level. Receiving a thorough account (an
ideological or causal account) at the low punishment level did not impact participants’
perceptions o f punishment fairness, Interactional Justice, anger, or intentions to retaliate
compared to receiving a superficial account (a redundant account) supporting Hypothesis
5. However, in contrast to the predictions o f Hypothesis 5, participants were more
satisfied when a thorough account was given compared to a superficial one at the low
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punishment level. The pattern o f results revealed that giving an individual an ideological
account provided no added benefit compared to giving a causal account. Additionally,
the results indicate that each of the accounts has the same effect on individuals’ attitudes
when given a weak punishment, although one must be cautious when support has been
given to a predicted null hypothesis such as that proposed in the second half o f
Hypothesis 5.
Exploratory analysis. This study proposed that social accounts would help relieve
the negative effects produced by administering high levels of punishment. Therefore, a
condition in which no account was given would be predicted to produce less punishment
fairness, satisfaction, and Interactional Justice, and would produce increased anger and
intention to retaliate than a condition in which an account was given. Unfortunately, the
results o f the first pilot study indicated that participants in the no account condition were
unaware that they did not receive an account and interpreted some o f the information
given in the beginning instructions as an adequate explanation for why they had tickets
removed. In an attempt to alleviate this problem, the experimenter altered the
instructions to the beginning o f the experiment so that participants could not misconstrue
why they had tickets removed. Additionally, instead o f giving the participants no
explanation for the ticket removal, they were given a short, vague, and superficial
explanation that provided participants only with redundant information.
In order to determine if having absolutely no account would produce a different
result for the five dependent variables, an exploratory analysis was performed. Fifteen
additional subjects were run through the experiment. These fifteen participants received
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the high punishment level and the no account condition. The participants were only run
through this condition because it was predicted that a difference between the redundant
account and no account would be best identified at the high punishment level.
The exploratory analysis was conducted for the five attitudinal dependent
variables. The redundant account (M=4.61) did not produce greater perceptions of
fairness than the no account (M ~5.17), t(l 85)—1.50, p>. 10. The redundant account
(M=5.35) did not produce greater feelings of Interactional Justice than the no account
(M=5.70), t(184)=.94, p>.10. The redundant account (M=5.35) did not produce greater
feelings o f satisfaction than the no account (M=5.87), t(l 85)=1.21, p>. 10. The redundant
account (M=3.64) did not incite less anger than the no account (M=3.20), t(185)=.64,
p>.10. Finally, the redundant account (M=4.23) did not incite the participants to retaliate
more than the no account (M=4.35), t(185)=1.45, p>.10. The results revealed that
providing the participants a short, superficial, and redundant account held the same
effectiveness at mitigating the negative effects o f the high punishment level as not
providing an account, thus, indicating that the administration of a weak explanation had
the same impact as giving no explanation at all.
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Chapter 8
Discussion
Despite the call from researchers to eliminate punishment because of its negative
impact on workers, punishment has a long-standing place in organizations (Butterfield,
Trevino, & Ball, 1996). Even with the negativity associated with organizational
discipline, management continues to use punishment as a way to change ineffective
behavior when positive reinforcement is not possible. The effectiveness of punishment
may depend on the level o f punishment given and how the punishment is justified.
Employees will not react to all punishments exactly the same. The severity of the
punishment and the adequacy o f the explanation will affect both the amount of behavior
change and employees’ resulting attitudes about the punishment, the administering
manager, and the organization. The manager who must give an employee a punishment
holds the tricky task o f administering the appropriate level o f punishment to change the
unwanted behavior without inciting negative feelings in the employee.
Researchers have repeatedly examined how the level of punishment affects
punishment effectiveness, but little consensus has been reached as to the most appropriate
level. In behavioral terms, punishment is an aversive stimulus that is intended to
decrease the likelihood o f an unwanted outcome (Lutz, 1994). The goal of punishment,
then, is to remove the unwanted behavior and to bring the employee into accordance with
the organizations’ expectations. Unfortunately, determining the appropriate punishment
is often difficult, and inappropriate punishments can be costly to the organization.
One effect an inappropriate punishment might have is not changing behavior.
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Punishments that are very lenient may not be strong enough to change employee
behaviors. If the punishment is too strong, the individual may be too strongly impacted
by the punishment, leaving the individual angry, frustrated, and unmotivated to perform
his/her job.
Individuals who are treated fairly during negative organizational outcomes
(selection decisions, layoffs, and pay reductions) tend to view the outcome as fair. One
way to treat an employee fairly during a punishment incident is to provide him/her with a
thorough explanation o f the reasons the punishment was given. In general, people want
to know the reasons why things happen to them, and punishment incidents are no
different. Individuals who receive an explanation in conjunction with a negative
outcome perceive the negative outcome as more fair compared to individuals who do not
receive an explanation (Bies & Shapiro, 1987). Thorough explanations will work to
build trust between the supervisor and employee, which will then produce positive
attitudes in the employee despite the negative outcome.
Decision-makers are faced with a dilemma: Do I give an employee a strong
punishment, which will result in behavior change but may result in the employee forming
negative attitudes? Or, do I give an employee a weak punishment, resulting in both little
behavior change and few negative attitudes? Based on the synthesis of previous research,
it was hypothesized that a manager can get substantial behavior change without
jeopardizing employees’ positive attitudes with the use of social accounts.
The aim of this study was to examine how punishment severity and different
types o f social accounts would work to impact performance and attitudes. Specifically, it
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was hypothesized that strong punishments would result in the greatest change in
performance. Additionally, it was proposed that the stronger punishments would have a
more negative impact on employee attitudes, and thorough explanations would have a
more positive effect on attitudes than a weak account. Finally, it was hypothesized that
the ideological account would have a more positive impact on attitudes at the strong
punishment level than either the causal account or the redundant account. The following
sections review the results o f the manipulation checks and dependent variables and the
implications o f these results. The chapter will conclude with an examination o f the
limitations o f this study and areas for future research.
Manipulation Checks
The participant’s perceptions of the severity of punishment were assessed with
two questions. As expected, the results revealed that participants’ perceptions of
punishment severity increased as the number o f tickets that were taken away increased.
Unexpectedly, the results from Question 2 in Questionnaire B revealed a significant
interaction, such that the punishment severity was perceived to be less severe when either
an ideological or causal account was given. The inconsistency in finding a significant
interaction for one o f the two items measuring the perceptions of punishment severity
was not anticipated. The two items were highly correlated, but the questions may not
have been perceived the same way due to their different rating scales. Unfortunately, it is
unknown exactly what aspect o f the two questions produced the unexpected results.
The effectiveness o f the social accounts was assessed with two questions
examining account adequacy and sufficiency. As expected, the participants viewed the
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ideological and causal accounts as more adequate and sufficient than the redundant
account. Therefore, explanations that gave a thorough justification as to why someone
received a punishment were viewed more favorably than explanations that provided a
weak justification. Additionally, punishment severity had a strong impact on the
perceived adequacy and sufficiency of the social accounts. Specifically, if a weak
punishment were given, accounts were considered more adequate and sufficient than they
were at either the moderate or high punishment levels.
One caveat should be made about these social account results, even though the
results were generally in the expected direction. The mean perception o f adequacy and
sufficiency was quite low. At the moderate and high punishment levels, the adequacy
and sufficiency ratings were not much higher than four on a 7-point scale for either the
ideological or causal accounts.
The weak effect o f the social accounts could have been due to multiple reasons.
First, the content o f the ideological and causal accounts may not have been strong enough
explanations to justify why the participant had tickets taken away. Therefore, the current
accounts were not strong enough to counteract the negative effects o f the moderate and
high severity level. Second the nonverbal medium used to present the social accounts
may have limited their effectiveness. Shapiro et al. (1994) found that causal accounts
were perceived to be more adequate when the explanation was presented verbally rather
than in a written format. Presenting the explanations verbally may have helped
strengthen the impact o f the justification. Finally, these social accounts may have
reached their maximum possible effectiveness and little could be done improve their
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impact. It is possible that peoples’ attitudes during punishment events are driven by the
punishment outcome, and social accounts may have little impact on reducing negative
attitudes. Social accounts may not be the answer to solving the punishment paradox.
Finally, many items were used to evaluate participants’ understanding of the
features o f the experiment. The possibility that participants did not understand key parts
o f the experiment could indicate that unintended stimuli affected the participants’
reactions in the study. With very few exceptions, participants understood the features of
the experiment. Participants’ understanding of both the value of the gift certificate and
the number o f tickets they received should have impacted participants’ perceptions of the
punishment severity. Only three and two people incorrectly identified the gift certificate
value and number o f tickets received, respectively.
A difficult aspect o f this study was developing Task 1 so that the length was short
enough that participants would almost finish but not so long that the participants would
not come close to finishing. Pilot research found that participants who did not come
close to finishing Task 1 did not perceive any o f the three punishment levels to be
punishing because they felt their performance was undeserving o f a reward. On the other
hand, when participants completed the task circling the majority of the “ts”, they
possessed a heightened perception of unfairness as a result of punishment. The number
o f participants finishing Task 1 and the number of people achieving 90% accuracy was
used to evaluate the appropriateness of Task 1’s length. The number of participants
completing Task 1 and achieving the 90% accuracy was small enough to assume that no
ceiling was placed on the amount o f performance change produced from Task 1 to Task2.
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Test o f Hypotheses
This study used a 3x3 between-subjects design to examine the effect of
punishment severity and account type on five attitudinal dependent variables and one
performance dependent variable. The five attitudinal dependent variables were fairness
o f the punishment, Interactional Justice, satisfaction with the experiment, anger, intention
to retaliate, and performance. Planned contrasts were used to evaluate the five
hypotheses o f the study.
Hypothesis 1 and 2 examined the effective of punishment severity and the
interaction o f punishment severity and social accounts on Task 2 performance after
accounting for Task 1 performance. Before examining the planned comparisons, an
ANCOVA was performed to gain a broad understanding of the results. The main effect
of punishment severity and the interaction of punishment severity and account type were
not significant. Unexpectedly, a main effect o f account type did emerge. Providing an
individual with a thorough explanation for his/her punishment may actually help increase
performance.
The planned comparisons o f Hypothesis 1 indicate that punishment severity had
no significant effect on Task 2 performance after controlling for Task 1 performance.
These results do not support Bennett’s (1998) results showing that the greatest increase in
performance occurs with stronger punishments. Intuitively, there is reason to believe that
participants’ lack o f motivation to perform on the Task 2 affected these results. This
study assumes that participants were motivated to win the $150 gift certificate. The distal
motivation produced by a gift certificate given away two to six months after participants
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completed the experiment may have not been enough incentive to perform well on Task
2. Additionally, the participants did not know about the $150 prize gift certificate before
they signed up for the experiment; therefore, the gift certificate may have been seen as a
bonus if participants won but may not have been a true motivator. Even though these
issues o f motivation seem relevant to this outcome, there is no evidence that participants
were not motivated to perform on Task 2. In fact, participants performed proportionally
better on Task 2 then they did on Task 1. Participants on average circled 294.58 out of
the 422 “t”s (70%) on Task 1 while participants circled 348.23 out of 460 “t”s (76%) on
Task 2. Undoubtedly, the increase in performance is affected in some capacity by a
practice effect, but there is no indication that participants were not motivated to perform
on Task 2.
Hypothesis 2 predicted an interaction of punishment severity and account type on
Task 2 performance after accounting for Task 1 performance, which has never been
examined in a punishment context. The results revealed that at the low punishment level,
none o f the social accounts affected performance; at the moderate punishment level, the
ideological and causal accounts produced a greater performance increase over Task 1
than the redundant account; and at the high punishment level, the type of account
received had no effect on performance. Receiving a thorough explanation and a moderate
punishment produced the greatest amount of performance after accounting for Task 1.
Interestingly, as Table 11 indicates, providing a social account produced greater
performance on Task 2 after accounting for Task 1 than providing a redundant account
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across all punishment levels. Providing a thorough explanation for a negative outcome
may benefit performance regardless of the outcome severity.
Next, the effect o f punishment severity and account type was examined on the
five attitudinal dependent variables. In order to form a broad understanding of the impact
o f punishment severity and account type on the five attitudinal variables, one multivariate
analysis o f variance using all five attitudinal dependent variables and five separate
univariate analysis o f variance tests were conducted. The MANOVA results revealed a
significant main effect o f punishment severity and a near significant main effect of
account type. The univariate analyses revealed a significant main effect o f punishment
for punishment fairness, satisfaction with the experiment, anger, and intentions to
retaliate and a near significant main effect for Interactional Justice. A significant main
effect o f social account type was found for Interactional Justice and satisfaction with the
experiment. No significant punishment severity by social account type interactions was
found for any o f the attitudinal dependent variables. Planned comparisons developed in
Hypotheses 3, 4, and 5 were used to further evaluate the effects of punishment severity
and account type on the five attitudinal dependent variables.
Previous research has shown that negative outcomes can have a detrimental effect
on peoples’ attitudes, such as perceptions of fairness (Adams, 1963, Brockner &
Wiesenfelt, 1996), Interactional Justice (Bies & Moag, 1986), satisfaction (Folger &
Konovsky 1989, Greenberg, 1990a), anger (Kemper, 1966), and intentions to retaliate
(Kemper, 1966). This study attempted to support previous research by examining how
different levels o f punishment affect peoples’ attitudes in Hypothesis 3.
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Hypothesis 3 predicted a main effect of punishment severity on fairness of
punishment, Interactional Justice, satisfaction with the experimenter, anger, and intention
to retaliate. The results indicated that as the punishment increases, punishment fairness
decreases, satisfaction with the experiment decreases, and anger increases. Participants’
willingness to retaliate only increased at the highest punishment level, which indicates
that acts o f retaliation may only occur when punishment outcomes are strong. Finally,
Interactional Justice was not affected by any o f the punishment levels. Interactional
Justice examines the interpersonal treatment an individual receives, and therefore, the
level o f the punishment may not have affected how participants viewed their
interpersonal treatment. In general, these results support the previous research findings
and extend them to the context o f punishment.
Hypothesis 4 tested the main effect of account type on the five attitudinal
variables. The results partially support the previous research that indicates that social
accounts can reduce the negative impact o f negative outcomes (Bies, 1986). The results
revealed that providing a thorough explanation increased participants’ feelings of
interpersonal fairness and satisfaction with the experiment. These results extend previous
research findings revealing that explanations increase peoples’ perceptions of
Interactional Justice to disciplinary situations. Building trust through interpersonal
relations can be very important in the workplace, and by providing thorough explanations
during the punishment, the manager may be able to keep the interpersonal relationship
intact in the face o f the disciplinary decision by using a social account.
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Unexpectedly, the main effects of account type on punishment fairness, anger,
and intentions to retaliate were not significant. These results indicate that the punishment
severity may have been more important in determining these attitudes than social
accounts. It is somewhat unexpected that these attitudes were not impacted by the
thorough explanations. Based on previous research findings, one would suspect that a
thorough explanation would decrease the perceived punishment severity and thereby
increase punishment fairness, decrease anger, and decrease intentions to retaliate.
Hypothesis 5 predicted an interaction between punishment severity and account
type; specifically, the ideological account would be more effective at reducing the
negative impact o f the high punishment level. The results for the five attitudinal
dependent variables were not significant. Support for previous research that has shown
ideological accounts to be more effective than causal accounts was not obtained (Bobocel
& Farrell, 1996). The two accounts had the equivalent impact on the participants’
attitudes. Based on the results testing Hypothesis 4 and Hypothesis 5, it appears that
more research needs to be undertaken to determine when explanations will be most
effective in a punishment context. The results did reveal that, as predicted, account type
did not effect participants’ perceptions of punishment fairness, Interactional Justice,
anger, or intentions to retaliate at the low punishment level. It is realized by the author
that this hypothesis predicted the acceptance o f the null hypothesis, and one should not
over interpret this result because it is unknown whether or not the result is due to the
experimental manipulations or due to measurement error, bias, or power issues. It is
possible to fail to reject the null for reasons other than the experimental manipulations.
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One exploratory analysis was conducted to examine how the no account condition
compared to the redundant account condition. Early in the experiment implementation, it
was discovered that participants who received no account explaining the punishment used
information provided in the instructions to interpret the punishment fairness. As a result,
the experiment had to be redesigned so that participants could not use the information
provided in the introductions. Specifically, two changes were made: (a) the instructions
were made more general and (b) the participants were given a very short, vague, and
redundant (information they already knew) explanation rather than receiving no
information about the punishment.
Fifteen participants received the no account, high punishment condition to
determine how the no account condition would compare to the redundant account
condition now that the instructions were general. Subjects were only run through the
high punishment severity condition because the biggest difference between the two
conditions should occur there. No differences were found between the two conditions.
Disciplinarians appear to be no better off providing a weak explanation than if they had
given no account at all.
Implication o f Findings
By performing a laboratory experiment, the experimenter has been able to control
for many extraneous variables that occur in organizational contexts. Therefore, one of
the benefits o f this research is that it examined the effects o f punishment severity and
account type without the influence o f any other organizational influences, such as
politics, subordinate-supervisor relationship, previous behavior, or previous punishments.
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Additionally, the adequate sample size, random assignment to conditions, and a sampling
of both males and females should allow for some generalization of results.
This study has many implications for individuals in power positions who
administer punishments. This study has shown that the level o f punishment may not be
the most important influence on peoples’ performance change. In fact, it was found that
the three levels o f punishment did not differ in their levels of performance. The impetus
for the increased performance was the interaction of social accounts and punishment
level. Only when a thorough social account explaining why the punishment was given
along with a moderate punishment was Task 2 performance significantly large.
This was a very interesting finding because it implies that managers may not need
to provide strong punishments to effect performance as previous researchers have
indicated (Bennett, 1998). Not having to provide people with strong punishments will
allow disciplinarians to improve performance without producing strong negative attitudes
towards him/her or the organization. This study determined that perceptions of
punishment fairness and satisfaction were lowest and anger and intentions to retaliate
were highest at the high punishment severity level. As a result, employees who do not
receive strong punishments will have better perceptions o f their managers and
organization.
One way to decrease the negative impact o f punishment is to provide social
accounts explaining in detail why the individual received the punishment. Managers who
provide a thorough explanation are working proactively to reduce the negative impact of
the punishment. This study found that thorough explanations did increase Interactional

109

Justice and satisfaction with the experiment compared to the redundant account
condition. Interestingly, the type of account given may not differentially impact peoples’
attitudes. It was predicted that an ideological account would display greater dignity and
respect to the recipient o f the punishment than the causal account because the ideological
account frames the discipline in terms o f a superordinate goal. Managers can use either
ideological or causal accounts so long as the punished individual perceives the account as
adequate.
Limitations
Before starting the experiment, all precautions were taken to ensure all
methodological concerns were dealt with before implementing the study. Unfortunately,
methodological issues arose during the study that could have caused the non-significant
results found in this study.
First, the current study was a laboratory experiment. The results of this study may
not generalize to organizational settings because many aspects o f this study were not
relevant to employees working in the “real world.” The effects of discipline in
organizational settings can be affected by many organizational and interpersonal
relationship factors that this study did not take into consideration. The discipline that
occurred in this study was between two individuals, the experimenter and the participant,
who had never met before. In organizational settings, punishment occurs between two
individuals, the subordinate and the manager, who have some type o f relationship. This
relationship can impact, either positively or negatively, the result o f the punishment.
Other factors such as the organizations’ climate for discipline, employees’ feelings about
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the manager or organization, the procedures used to determine the punishment, and how
the problem behavior was investigated will impact how employees will view the
punishment incident.
Second, the method used to motivate participants to perform in this study was not
equivalent to how people are motivated to perform in the workplace. In this study,
participants could gain lottery tickets for a $150 gift certificate that would be given away
to one o f the participants after all the data had been collected. This distal reinforcer
appears to be motivating to some participants because performance on Task 2 was
proportionally better than the performance on Task 1. In the work place, managers often
hold many immediate reinforcers, such as pay or promotions that if removed would be
extremely motivating to an employee. Even though mildly reinforcing, this $150 gift
certificate may have not been strong enough to produce the motivation needed to truly
impact performance. It would be extremely interesting to see how different
organizational punishers affect employee performance.
Third, the tasks o f this study provided many problems. The first problem with the
two tasks was the lack o f control on how people performed on Task 1. Performance on
Task 1 ranged from very well to very poor. As would be expected, how you performed
on Task 1 may affect how you viewed the punishment. As a result there was more
variability in the punishment severity perceptions than was expected.
The second problem with the tasks was the length o f the tasks. As stated above,
the variability o f scores on Task 1 made it difficult to develop Task 1 so that it was long
enough for the good performers and not too long for the poor performers. Many trials
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were taken to find the optimal length, and even then some participants finished the task.
Task 2 was longer than Task 1 to reduce the ceiling effect produced by excellent
performers. Anecdotal evidence indicates that the longer Task 2 may have actually
motivated poor performers to reduce their effort level on Task 2 because they were
unable to finish the shorter Task 1. Some poor performers believed that they were
definitely not going to finish the longer Task 2 regardless o f their effort. Even though
Task 2 performance was proportionally better than Task 1, the difference between the
two performance levels could have been greater if it was possible to make the tasks
equivalent. Due to the variability o f Task 1 performance, there was little that could be
done to make the task lengths any more similar.
The third problem with the tasks was that they were completely based on effort.
Participants circled upper and lower-case “ts” in the two tasks. No skill or training was
needed to perform these tasks. It is uncertain how punishment would affect performance
on other tasks that required more technical skill or cognitive ability.
The fourth problem with the tasks was the possibility o f a practice effect. Any
time people are measured more than once with similar measures, there is the possibility
that people will perform better on the second measure because they use information they
learned on the previous measures. In this case, participants may have performed better
on Task 2 because o f the practice they had on Task 1. The experimenter attempted to
control the practice effects by using a completely different passage to circle “ts” for Task
2, and an ANCOVA was used to analyze the data so that performance on Task 1 could be
controlled.
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Future Research
The results o f this study provide some support for the importance o f punishment
severity and social accounts in changing unwanted behaviors and maintaining peoples’
positive attitudes. Despite the significant findings, this study has produced many more
questions than it has answered. This section highlights the many areas o f future research
that this study has stimulated.
First, future studies should examine punishment incidents in applied settings.
Other studies have examined employee attitudes after punishment incidents in
organizational settings, but no studies have examined the most effective punishments that
will produce behavior change (Ball, Trevino, Sims, 1993; Trevino & Weaver, 1998).
Understanding how to decrease the negative attitudes accompanying punishment is an
important and noble goal, but researchers first need to gain a better understanding of the
most effective ways to change behavior.
This study specifically examined one o f the many procedural methods to reduce
the negative impact o f punishment. Providing explanations was found to increase
Interactional Justice and satisfaction. Additional research should examine how other
procedural justice components - such as employee participation in the punishment,
punishment consistency, non-biased decision-making, and a match between the
punishment and behavior - impact peoples’ attitudes after the punishment incident.
Based on research by Leventhal (1980), it is expected that all o f these features should
have some effect on the perceived punishment fairness.
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The punishment in this study attempted to change participants’ performance on a
simple, uncomplicated task. Punishment is used in situations other than those that
attempt to change performance. Robinson and Greenberg (1998) defined six different
types o f antisocial behavior, including (a) workplace deviance; (b) antisocial behavior;
(c) employee vice; (d) organizational misbehavior; (e) workplace aggression; and (f) noncompliant behavior. Future research should examine the punishment intensity and
implementation method that is most effective at changing unwanted behaviors other than
poor performance.
In this study all the participants were set up to receive a punishment regardless of
their performance. In organizations, hopefully this would not be the case. Managers
should work hard to help their employees succeed. Organizations provide employee
training, provide goal setting and feedback, and assist troubled employees with employee
assistance programs as ways to fix behavior before punishment is necessary. During
these interventions, performance and behavior expectations are usually directly or
indirectly disclosed to the employee. Future research should examine how people
perceive the punishment fairness when clear, specific performance expectations are set
and when they are not.
Finally, more research needs to examine how and when social accounts will have
the greatest ability to diminish the negative effect o f punishment. The mean adequacies
for both social accounts were much lower than expected, especially in the moderate and
low punishment levels. Bies, Shapiro, and Cummings (1988) explain that all claims of
mitigating circumstances are not the same. This suggests that some explanations are
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better than others. In this study, it appears that one account will not work in all
situations. With a strong punishment, a new explanation is needed that provides a better
and more thorough justification. Future research should examine what types and levels
o f thoroughness work best at different levels o f punishment.
Additionally, an account’s effectiveness may be linked to the interpersonal nature
in which it is presented to its audience. In this study, each participant was given a sheet
o f paper with the punishment explanation. The experimenter participated in no verbal
conversation with the participants, and participants were not allowed to ask questions
about punishment outcome. Thus, in this situation, the personalness o f the social accounts
was very low. Future research should examine how the social account’s content and the
perceived personalness o f the account’s presentation interact to reduce the effect of
negative outcomes.
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Appendix A
Subject Number
Task: #1

Instructions: You will be given an editing-type task. For this task you must
circle all o f the upper and lower case letter Ts (all “t”s and “T”s) that are found in
the passage. You will receive 10 lottery tickets for performing satisfactorily on
this task. Your performance will be measured as the number o f Ts you circle
minus any circling errors (e.g. circling the incorrect letter). Therefore, it is to
your advantage to work as quickly and accurately as you possibly can. You will
be given 10 minutes to complete the task. A short practice passage has been
provided to let you practice performing the task before beginning the first real
task.

Practice Passage
Circle all of the Ts that appear in this passage.
When I wrote the following pages, or rather the bulk of them, I lived
alone, in the woods, a mile from any neighbor, in a house which I built myself, on
the shore o f Walden Pond, in Concord, Massachusetts, and earned my living by
the labor o f my hands only. I lived there for two years and two months. At
present I am a sojourner in civilized life again.

Turn to the next page for the correctly circled Ts.
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Practice Passage
When I wrote the following pages, or rather the bulk of them, I li ved
alone, in the woods, a mile from any neighbor, in a house which I built myself, on
the shore o f Walden Pond, in Concord, Massachusetts, and earned my living by
the labor o f my hands only. I lived there for two years and two months. At
present I am a sojourner in civilized life again.

To achieve 100% accuracy on this task, you should have correctly circled 17 Ts (5 in line
one, 2 in line two, 3 in line three, 6 in line four, and 1 in line five).
You will be given 10 minutes to perform this task. After 10 minutes, the experimenter
will ask you to please STOP working at which time please put down your pencils and
wait for further instructions.
If you have any questions about performing the task, please ask the experimenter at this
time.
Do Not Turn the Page Until Instructed to Do So!
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Circle all upper and lower case Ts found in the Passage.
I was bom in the year 1632, in the city of York, o f a good family, though not of
that country, my father being a foreigner of Bremen, who settled first at Hull: he got a
good estate by merchandise, and, leaving off his trade, lived afterwards in York, from
whence he had married my mother, whose relations were named Robinson, a very good
family in that country, and from whom I was called Robinson Kreutzaer; but, by the
usual corruption o f words in England, we are now called, nay, we call ourselves, and
write our name Crusoe, and so my companions always called me.
I had two elder brothers, one of which was lieutenant-colonel to an English
regiment o f foot in Flanders, formerly commanded by the famous Colonel Lockhart, and
was killed in battle near Dunkirk against the Spaniards: what became o f my second
brother I never knew, any more than my father or mother did know what was become of
me.
Being the third o f three sons of the family, and not bred to any trade, my head
began to be filled very early with rambling thoughts. My father, who was very ancient,
had given me a competent share o f learning, as far as house education and a country free
school generally goes, and designed me for the law; but I would be satisfied with nothing
but going to sea, and my inclination to this led me so strongly against the will, nay, the
command o f my father, and against all the entreaties and persuasions o f my mother and
other friends, that there seemed to be something fatal in that propension o f nature tending
directly to the life o f misery which was to befall me.
My father, a wise and grave man, gave me serious and excellent counsel against
what he foresaw was my design. He called me one morning into his chamber, where he
was confined by the gout, and expostulated very warmly with me upon the subject. He
asked me what reasons more than the mere wandering inclination I had for leaving my
father’s house and my native country, where I might be introduced, and had a prospect of
raising my fortune by application and industry, with a life o f ease and pleasure. He told
me it was for men o f desperate fortunes on one hand, or of aspiring, superior fortunes on
the other, who went abroad upon adventures, to rise by enterprise, and make themselves
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famous in undertakings o f a nature out of the common road; that these things were all
either too far above me, or too far below me; that mine was the middle state, or what
might be called the upper station of low life, which he had found by long experience was
the best state in the world, the most suited to human happiness, not exposed to the
miseries and hardships, the labor and sufferings of the mechanic part of mankind, and not
embarrassed with the pride, luxury, ambition, and envy of the upper part of mankind. He
told me I might judge of the happiness of this state by this one thing-namely, that this was
the state o f life which all other people envied; that kings have frequently lamented the
miserable consequences o f being bom to great things, and wish they had been placed in
the middle of the two extremes, - between the mean and the great; that the wise man gave
his testimony to this as the just standard of tme felicity, when he prayed to have neither
property nor riches.
He bid me observe it, and I should always find, that the calamities of life were
shared among the upper and lower part of mankind; but that the middle station had the
fewer disasters, and was not exposed to so many vicissitudes as the higher or lower part
of mankind; nay, they were not subjected to so many distempers and uneasiness either of
body or mind, as those were who, by vicious living, luxury, and extravagances on one
hand, or by hard labor, what o f necessaries and means or insufficient diet on the other
hand, bring distempers upon themselves by the natural consequences o f their way of
living; that the middle station o f life was calculated for all kind o f virtues and all kind of
enjoyments; that peace and plenty were the handmaids of the middle fortune; that
temperance, moderation, quietness, health, society, all agreeable diversions, and all
desirable pleasure, were the blessings attending the middle station of life; that this way
men went silently and smoothly through the world, and comfortably out of it, not
embarrassed with the labors o f the hands or o f the head, not sold to the life of slavery for
daily bread, or harassed with perplexed circumstances, which rob the soul of peace and
the body o f rest; not engaged with the passion o f envy, or secret burning lust of ambition
for great things; but in easy circumstances sliding gently through the world, and sensibly
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tasting the sweets o f living, without the bitter; feeling that they are happy, and learning
by every day’s experience to know it more sensibly.
After this, he pressed me earnestly, and in the most affectionate manner, not to
play the young man, not to precipitate myself into miseries which nature and the station
of life I was bom in seemed to have provided against; that I was under no necessity of
seeking my bread; that he would do well for me and endeavor to enter me fairly into the
station o f life which he had been just recommending me; and that if I was not very happy
in the world, it must be my mere fare or fault that must hinder it.

Appendix B
Subject Number:
Questionnaire A

Instructions:

While the research assistant is grading your task, please answer these
questions. Please read each of the following questions carefully and answer the
questions in the format provided. After finishing the questionnaire please put the
questionnaire back into the folder and wait for the research assistant to give you
further instructions.
All answers that you provide in the questionnaire will be kept strictly confidential.

Thank you very much for your assistance!

Please fill out the following information. Thank you.
1. Sex: (Check one)
Male

_____

Female

_____

2. Age (fill in y ea rs)_____________

3. Year in School (check one)
freshman

_____

sophomore

_____

junior

_____

senior_______ _____
nondegree

_____

graduate

_____

4. Major: (fill in) ______________________

Please Turn to the Next Page.

129

Please Fill Out the Following Information. Thank You.
5. What dollar amount is the gift certificate that you have a chance to win in the lottery?
(fill in the exact value) $____________

6. What percentage o f the Ts did you need to circle on Task 1 to be awarded all 10
lottery tickets?
(fill in the percentage)_______ %

7. Did you complete all five pages o f the task?
(Check one)

Yes

No

Please Turn to the Next Page
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8. What prior experience have you had with editing tasks, either in research settings or in
school (proof reading papers, etc.)? Describe three such experiences.

9. Please explain the strategies you use to effectively perform these editing tasks.

10. What prior work experiences have you had with simple tasks (e.g. filing, data entry,
etc.)?

11. Please explain the strategies you used to most efficiently perform these tasks.

12. If you had to teach someone else how to perform Task 1 what steps would you tell
them to follow?

Please place the questionnaire back into the folder, and wait for the research
assistant to give further instructions. Thank you for your assistance.
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Appendix C
Subject Number:

Questionnaire B
Instructions: Please fill out the questionnaire in the format provided. If you have any
questions about the number o f tickets you received for Task 1, please look back at the
scoring sheet given to you by the experimenter. After finishing the questionnaire, please
place the questionnaire back in the envelope and wait for instructions from the
experimenter. PLEASE READ EACH QUESTION CAREFULLY AND ANSWER
HONESTLY!!!!

1. How many tickets did you earn on Task 1? (please enter the number) ________
2. If you earned fewer than 10 tickets for Task 1, how much o f a penalty did you feel this
was (circle one value) (If your received all 10 tickets circle N/A)?
1
Slight

2

3
4
Moderate

5
Strong

6

7
Severe

N/A

3. (If you received fewer then 10 tickets, please complete question #3. If you received
all 10 tickets for task 1 please skip question #3 and continue on to question #4.)
I feel that the penalty I received for Task 1 was:
(circle one value for each scale a., b., and c.)
a.

Mild

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Severe

b.

Lenient

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Extreme

c.

Inadequate

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Excessive

4. The experimenter was responsible for the decision to take away lottery tickets for not
reaching the 90% accuracy score.
1
Strongly
Disagree

2

3

4
Neither agree
nor disagree

5

6

7
Strongly
Agree

5. Who was responsible for the decision to remove lottery tickets (Circle one).
The Experimenter

The Thesis Committee
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6. How do you feel about the number o f tickets you received?
It was (circle one value for each scale a., b., c., d., and e.):
a.

Fair

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Unfair

b.

Improper

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Proper

c.

Just

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Injust

d.

Unreasonable 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Reasonable

e.

Warranted

2

3

4

5

6

7

Unwarranted

1

7. How adequate was the explanation provided on the Task 1 Score Sheet that describes
why you had tickets taken away (the punishment).

1
Extremely
Inadequate

2

3

4
5
Neither Adequate
nor Inadequate

6

7
Extremely
Adequate

8. How sufficient was the explanation provided on the Task 1 Score Sheet that describes
why you had tickets taken away (the punishment).

1
Extremely
Insufficient

2

3

4
5
Neither sufficient
nor Insufficient

6

7
Extremely
Sufficient

9. The experimenter has dealt with me in a truthful manner.

1
Strongly
Disagree

3

4
Neither agree
nor disagree

5

7
Strongly
Agree

10. The experimenter has treated me with dignity and respect.

1
Strongly
Disagree

3

4
Neither agree
nor disagree

5

7
Strongly
Agree

5

7
Strongly

11. The experimenter has been polite.

1
Strongly

3

4
Neither agree

133

Disagree

Agree

nor disagree

12. The experimenter has treated me with kindness.
1
Strongly
Disagree

7
Strongly
Agree

Neither agree
nor

13. The experimenter has been open and honest with me.
1
Strongly
Disagree

7
Strongly
Agree

Neither agree
nor disagree

14. I am satisfied with the way the experimenter has conducted the experiment so far.
1
Strongly
Disagree

7
Strongly
Agree

Neither agree
nor disagree

15. I am satisfied with the explanation for why I received the number of tickets I did.
1
Strongly
Disagree

7
Strongly
Agree

Neither agree
nor disagree

16. I am satisfied with how the experimenter has treated me during the experiment.
1
Strongly
Disagree

7
Strongly
Agree

Neither agree
nor disagree

17. How do you feel about the number o f tickets you received for Task 1?
I feel (circle one value for each scale a., b., c., and d.):
a.
b.

Angry
Resentful

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Happy
Unresentful

c.

Outraged

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Satisfied

d.

Upset

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Calm

Please place the questionnaire back into yellow folder upon completion. Thank you!
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Appendix D
Subject Number

Task: #2

Instructions: You will be given an editing-type task. For this task you must
circle all o f the upper and lower case letter Ts (all “t”s and “T”s) that are found in
the passage. You will receive 10 lottery tickets for performing satisfactorily on
this task. Your performance is measured as the number of Ts you circle minus
any circling errors (e.g. circling the incorrect letter). Therefore, it is to your
advantage to work as quickly and accurately as you possibly can. You will be
given 10 minutes to complete the task.

You will be given 10 minutes to perform this task. After 10 minutes, the
experimenter will ask you to please STOP working at which time please put down
your pencils and wait for further instructions.

Do Not Turn the Page Until Instructed to Do So!
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Circle all of the upper and lower case Ts in the Passage.
I never traveled in this journey above two miles outright in a day, or thereabouts.
But I took so may turns and returns to see what discoveries I could make that I came
weary enough to the place where I resolved to sit down for all night; and then I either
reposed m yself in a tree, or surrounded m yself with a row o f stakes set upright in the
ground, either from one tree or another, or so as no wild creature could come at me
without waking me.
As soon as I came to the seashore I was surprised to see that I had taken up my lot
on the worst side o f the island; for here, indeed, the shore was covered with innumerable
turtles, whereas on the other side I had found but three in a year and a half. Here was
also an infinite number o f fowls o f many kinds; some which I had seen, and some which I
had not seen before- and many o f them very good meat- but such as I knew not the names
of, except those called penguins.
I could have shot as many as I pleased, but was very sparing o f my powder and
shot, and therefore had more mind to kill a she-goat if I could, which I could better feed
on; and though there were many goats here- more than on my side o f the island- yet it
was with much more difficulty that I could come near them, the country being flat and
even, and they saw me much sooner than when I was on the hill.
I confess this side o f the country was much pleasanter than mine; but yet I had not
the least inclination to remove, for as I was fixed in my habitation it became natural to
me, and I seemed all the while I was here to be as it were upon a journey, and from home.
However, I traveled along the shore of the sea towards the east, I suppose about twelve
miles; and then, setting up a great pole upon the shore for a mark, I concluded I would go
home again, and that the next journey I took should be on the other side o f the island east
from my dwelling, and so round till I came to my post again: of which in its place.
I took another way to come back than that I went, thinking I could easily keep all
the island so much in my view that I could not miss finding my first dwelling by viewing
the country. But I found myself mistaken; for being come about two or three miles, I
found m yself descended into a very large valley, but so surrounded with hills, and those
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hills covered with wood, that I could not see which was my way by direction but that of
the sun, nor even then, unless I knew very well the position of the sun at that time o f the
day.
I could not tell what part o f the world this might be, otherwise than that I knew it
must be part o f America, and, as I concluded by my observations, must be near the
Spanish dominions; and perhaps was all inhabited by savages, where, if I should have
landed, I had been in a worse condition than I was now; and therefore I acquiesced in the
dispositions o f Providence, which I began now to own and to believe ordered everything
for the best; I say I quieted my mind with this, and left afflicting m yself with fruitless
wishes o f being there.
Besides, after some pause upon this affair, I considered that if this land was
Spanish coast, I should certainly, one time or other, see some vessel pass or repass one
way or the other; but if not, then it was the savage coast between the Spanish country
and Brazil, which are indeed the worst of savages, for they are cannibals, or men-eaters,
and fail not to murder and devour all the human bodies that fall into their hands.
With these considerations I walked very leisurely forward. I found that side of
the island where I now was much pleasanter than mine; the open savanna fields sweet,
adorned with flowers and grass, and full of very fine woods. I saw abundance of parrots,
and fain I would have caught one, if possible, to have kept it to be tame, and taught it to
speak to me. I did, after some painstaking, catch a young parrot, for I knocked it down
with a stick, and having recovered it I brought it home; but it was some years before I
could make him speak. However, at last I taught him to call me by my name very
familiarly. But the accident that followed, though it be trifle, will be very diverting in its
place.
I was exceedingly diverted with this journey. I found in the low grounds hares, as
I thought them to be and foxes; but they differed greatly from all the other kinds I had
met with, not could I satisfy myself to eat them, though I killed several. But I had no
need to be venturous, for I had not want for food, and o f that which was very good too;
especially these three sorts- namely, goats, pigeons, and turtle or tortoise, which, added to
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my grapes, Leadenhall Market could not have furnished a table better than I in proportion
to the company. And though my case was deplorable enough, yet I had great cause for
thankfulness, and that I was not driven to any extremities for food, but rather plenty, even
to dainties.
It happened to my further misfortune, that the weather proved to be hazy for three
or four days while I was in the valley; and not being able to see the sun, I wandered about
very uncomfortably, and at last was obliged to find the sea-side, look for my post, and
come back the same way I went. And then by easy journey I turned homeward, the
weather being exceedingly hot, and my gun, ammunition, hatchet, and other things very
heavy.
I reposed myself here a week, to rest and regale myself after my long journey;
during which most o f the dime was taken up in the weighty affair of making a cage for
my poll, who began now to be a mere domestic, and to be mighty well acquainted with
me. Then I began to think of the poor kid which I had penned in within my little circle,
and resolved to go and fetch it home or give it some food.
Accordingly, I went, and found it where I left it; for, indeed, it could not get out,
but almost starved for want o f food. I went and cut boughs of trees and branches of such
shrubs as I could find, and threw it over; and having fed it, I tied it as I did before, to lead
it away. But it was so tame with being hungry that I had no need to have tied it, for it
followed me like a dog; and as I continually fed it, the creature became so loving, so
gentle, and so fond, that it became from that time one of my domestics also, and would
never leave me afterwards.
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Appendix E
Subject Number:
Questionnaire C

Instructions:

Please read each of the following questions carefully and answer the
questions in the format provided. After finishing the questionnaire please put the
questionnaire back into the folder and wait for the research assistant to give you
further instructions.
All answers that you provide in the questionnaire will be kept strictly confidential.

Thank you very much for your assistance!
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1. Please describe the purpose o f this study in your own words.

2. What knowledge do you think the experimenter was trying to gain by performing this
study?

Please fill out the enclosed survey!!!
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Dear Participants,
The Psychology Department takes great pride in developing competent
and knowledgeable graduate students. The Psychology Department is in the
process of evaluating its graduate students to ensure that they have the proper
research skills.
It has come to our attention that the experimenter performing the
experiment you are currently participating in may be unfairly treating his/her
participants. Specifically, there is a procedure in the experiment that some
individuals might find punishing. As part of the evaluation of this researcher and
his/her experiment, we would invite you to answer the three questions found at
the bottom of this survey. Your honest responses will provide the Psychology
Department and this researcher valuable feedback. Please answer honestly the
following questions based on the experiences you had in this experiment. The
information you provide us will be kept strictly confidential. The responses you
provide on this survey will in no way affect your standing at the University of
Nebraska at Omaha. After completing the survey, please fold the survey and
place it in the white envelope provided by the experimenter. Finally, seal the
envelope to ensure anonymity. The experimenter will forward the survey to the
Psychology Department.
Thank you for your cooperation,
University of Nebraska at Omaha Psychology Department
Based on your experience with this researcher:

1. I would recommend this research experiment to other students (circle one).
SD
Strongly
disagree

D
Disagree

N
Neutral

A
Agree

SA
Strongly
agree

2. If given the opportunity, I would not participate in research by the same
experimenter (circle one).
SD
Strongly
disagree

D
Disagree

N
Neutral

A
Agree

SA
Strongly
agree

3. Overall, I believe the experiment was performed well (circle one).
SD
Strongly
disagree

D
Disagree

N
Neutral

A
Agree

SA
Strongly
agree
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Appendix F
Subject Number:
Task # 1 Scoring Sheet

Number o f tickets taken away: none (0) o r ________________

The number o f tickets you received for completing this task:

(The account will go here or on a separate sheet of paper)

Remember you can get an additional 10 tickets by performing satisfactorily on Task

#2 .
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Appendix G
Informed Consent Form
THE EXAMINATION OF INDIVIDUAL’S PERFORMANCE ON SIMPLE
TASKS.
You are invited to participate in this research study. The information in this consent form
is provided to help you decide whether to participate. If you have any questions, please
do not hesitate to ask.
You were selected for participation in this study because you are an English-speaking
adult.
The purpose of this study is to examine how people perform on simple tasks.
You will be asked to perform two editing tasks that will take 10 minutes each.
Additionally, you will be asked to complete three short questionnaires. Approximately
40 minutes o f your time will be required.
There are no known risks or discomforts associated with this research.
The information collected by the tasks and questionnaires in this study will be identified
by number and not by name. There will be no information that could identify you as an
individual. All responses to the questionnaires will be kept confidential.
You will have the possibility o f winning a $150 gift certificate that will be given away
through a lottery system by participating in the study.
You have rights as a research participant. These rights are explained in The Rights o f
Research Participants which you have been given. If you have any questions concerning
your rights, you may contact the Institutional Review Board (IRB), telephone (402) 5596463.
You are free to decide not to participate in this study or to withdraw at any time without
adversely affecting your relationship with the investigators or the University of Nebraska.
Your decision will not result in any loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.
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DOCUMENTATION OF INFORMED CONSENT
YOU ARE VOLUNTARILY MAKING A DECISION WHETHER OR NOT TO
PARTICIPATE IN THIS RESEARCH STUDY. YOUR SIGNATURE CERTIFIES
THAT YOU HAVE DECIDED TO PARTICIPATE HAVING READ AND
UNDERSTOOD THE INFORMATION PRESENTED. YOU WILL BE GIVEN A
COPY OF THIS CONSENT FORM TO KEEP.

SIGNITURE OF PARTICIPANT

DATE

IN MY JUDGMENT THE PARTICIPANT IS VOLUNTARILY AND
KNOWINGLY GIVING INFORMED CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS
RESEARCH STUDY.

SIGNATURE OF INVESTIGATOR

DATE

IDENTIFICATION OF THE INVESTIGATORS
PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR
Andy Noon

Off: 554-2591

SECONDARY INVESTIGATOR
Wayne Harrison, Ph.D.

Off: 554-2452
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Appendix H

Ideological Account
Unfortunately, you did not circle enough Ts to achieve the 90% accuracy
criterion necessary to earn all 10 lottery tickets for Task 1. As you can see, you did
receive some lottery tickets for your efforts. Since you did not receive all 10 tickets, I
feel that it is important that you know why you received the number o f tickets you did.
A recent research study in the Journal o f Applied Psychology found that the
removal o f a positive incentive can effectively increase individuals’ motivation to
perform. The tasks that are performed in this study are effort tasks. During effort tasks,
individuals’ level o f motivation has a greater influence on their performance than does
their level o f ability.
I have taken away these tickets hopefully to help motivate you to perform better
on Task 2. Since you did not reach the performance criterion, it is definitely important
that you perform well on Task 2 so that you will gain all 10 tickets for that task. You still
have a great opportunity to gain all 10 lottery tickets for Task 2, so I hope you will be
motivated to perform your best on Task 2. By gaining all 10 lottery tickets, you will have
a greater chance o f winning the $150 gift certificate.

Causal Account
Unfortunately, you did not circle enough Ts to achieve the 90% accuracy
criterion necessary to earn all 10 lottery tickets for Task 1. As you can see, you did
receive some lottery tickets for your efforts. Since you did not receive all 10 tickets, I
feel that it is important that you know why you received the number o f tickets you did.
My Thesis committee decided that participants who did not perform satisfactorily
would have some o f their tickets taken away to increase their motivation to perform on
Task 2. The committee felt that the level of punishment you received was most
appropriate to motivate participants to perform better on Task 2. I was not responsible
for determining the punishment you received. You will still have an opportunity on Task
2 to gain 10 tickets to use in the lottery for the $150 gift certificate.
Redundant Account
You did not receive all 10 lottery tickets because you did not perform
satisfactorily on Task 1.

